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ARISTOTLE'S
Nicomachean Ethics,
Books v & x.
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS,
Books V & X,

TRANSLATED,
WITH A REVISED GREEK TEXT AND
BRIEF EXPLANATORY NOTES,

BY
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4 a.
PREFACE.

This little Work was composed as a literary experiment,—I might almost say, as a literary amusement,—and without any view to publication. It was intended indeed merely as a manual that might serve me in reading these subjects with pupils. My object was to try if the difficult, but as I think, most interesting Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics could not be made fairly intelligible to the average student, without the long and scarcely less difficult notes that accompany it in the editions commonly in use. To this Book I added the Tenth, not so much because it seemed to stand next in difficulty, but because of its great beauty and almost divine morality. This then is the reason of and the apology for the anomaly of two only, and those not consecutive, Books out of ten being offered to the public in this form. The Translation is, of course, wholly new,* and it is as fairly literal as the nature

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* I have however consulted the translations of Mr. Chase and and Mr. Williams throughout. The latter is rather a paraphrase than a translation: but it is very good and useful, as representing the author's mind and meaning in the form of an English Essay. For the sake of brevity, I have but seldom referred to the well-known editions of Jell and Grant, though, I am familiar with them.
of the subject admits of. The art and the merit of a good translation is, that as far as possible the author should thereby be made to explain himself. Of course, the subtle mind of Aristotle, and his minute definitions, classifications, and subdivisions,—one might fairly say, the combination of logic and sophistry (I do not mean in the bad sense) that his writings display,—are not very easy to follow under any circumstances. Yet I think a really good and lucid translation is often in itself the best commentary, especially when aided by a brief note or remark here and there, just to guide the student, but not to save him the trouble of thinking. It will be seen at once that this small book has no pretensions whatever beyond the giving a correct version of the Greek, as far as it was in my power to do so; and this part, whatever its merits may be, has been executed with care and thought. Bekker’s text has been adopted; but I have made several suggestions as to the readings, and have therefore described it as “revised,” though I have not in fact altered it.

Conceding the opinion generally held by the learned, that the Fifth Book is not due directly to Aristotle, but was compiled by his pupil Eudemus, and so belongs really to the Eudemian Ethics, though representing the opinions and the teaching of the Master,* I cannot but think that a treatise which contains the first germs of the Science of Political Economy, and the leading principles of both administrative and commercial justice and equity, has a great interest for these, and indeed for all

times. We find Aristotle expounding to his readers as a modern judge would to a jury the distinctions between Manslaughter, Accidental Death, and Murder or Damage with wilful intent; and showing that all guilt turns primarily not on fact, but on the animus with which it is done. We have a definition of Equity, as distinct from statute-law, which cannot be surpassed either in accuracy or simplicity; 'the correction of injustice done in particular cases, by the inevitable defect of the law being only general.'

Sir A. Grant disparages the Fifth Sixth and Seventh (the "Eudemian") Books, as confused in style and expression, wanting in method, as touching on questions without fairly dealing with them, and especially as leaving "the moral view of justice as an individual virtue strangely deficient." To me it appears that an author, or rather perhaps a teacher, who nowhere makes Moral Responsibility a basis of his system of Morals, who owns no obedience to a Divine Law, and recognises no Future State (except vaguely, as a possibility and a speculation, Eth. i. 11,) who moreover was the first to attempt to expound philosophically the principles of justice in its practical and social aspects,* and who wished to reduce it to and formulate it by his one great rule of human action, the Mean,—had grave difficulties to contend with, and I cannot help thinking that on the whole he

* Plato everywhere dwells on the moral aspects of Justice; it was no part of Aristotle's purpose to do so, as it seems to me. Indeed, as Mr. Cope remarks (Prelection p. 14, 15,) he acknowledges no essential distinction of right and wrong, no absolute and necessary rules and principles of morality.
has met them admirably. Aristotle’s leading idea of Justice was that of a line divided into two equal parts. His favourite word ἴσος, ‘fair,’ means primarily that the μέσον or Mean represents a point equidistant from the ἄκρα or extremes; while injustice is the unequal division of the line whereby one side gets a larger portion than the other. But there are cases (the κατ’ ἀναλογίαν) in which such unequal division is fair, i.e. when the claimants are of unequal rank or merit; and here, at first sight, we have the anomaly, that a point in a line at once is and is not the μέσον. The inequality is shown to extend to commerce as well as to distribution and also to punishment. Hence the laws of relative proportion have to be discussed. The cutting off a part from the greater and adding it on to the less,—in other words, the adjustment of loss and gain, ζημία and κέρδος,—is shown to be the means of restoring the balance.

The doctrine of Reciprocity (ἀντιστίθενθος) seems, at first sight, quite a different principle from the law of ‘the mean.’ “You hit me, and I have a right to hit you in return,” does not at once suggest the same idea of justice as a line equally divided. It is a rough and ready principle, a kind of lynch-law, which is often very unfair in its workings. But Aristotle shows that both are reducible to the same principles, the adjustment of loss and gain, or a balance struck between one who has taken an advantage (the aggressor) and one who has suffered a wrong (the aggrieved). He also shows that the same principle of reciprocity, ultimately identical with ἴσος, forms the law of all commerce and barter, and determines the relations between producer and consumer. “I will give you this if you will give me that” is a principle of mutual accomo-
dation. And the necessity of a common standard, to determine values in exchange, he shows to have been the origin of νόμοσμα, or a legal currency.

Injustice however is not limited to mere unfairness or more-getting, πλεονεξία. It extends also to breaking the law, or doing anything which the law even by implication forbids. And hence particular or partial injustice is distinguished from ἀληθεκλα, or thorough badness. So also there are cases which mere reciprocity, or "tit for tat," will not suit, as in distributing shares, or adjusting inequalities between claimants. Another difficulty connected with the Mean is, that justice is not, like the other virtues, a mean between opposite vices; since both too much and too little are alike unjust. On these and some other questions, which are rather extraneous and unpractical subtleties than necessary parts of the argument, the author treats at some length, and with an unsatisfied minuteness which the subjects seem hardly to deserve. Such are,

1. Whether a man can be said to wrong himself.
2. The doing unjust acts without being habitually unjust, i.e. ἀκοποσία rather than ἐκοποσία.
3. Is the giver or the receiver of too much (more than a fair share) in the wrong?
4. Is the doing wrong worse than the being wronged?*

Lastly, the justice of obedience is discussed, as that of the slave to the master, the child to the parent, and of passion to reason.

The Tenth Book turns on the subjects of Pleasure and

* See Plato, Gorgias, p. 474 sqq.
Happiness, and is, in its conclusion, introductory to the Politics. The question, whether Pleasure is the chief good, is fairly considered, and without marked bias on either side. The author pursues much the same line of argument as Plato in the Philebus, viz. that bad pleasures are not really pleasures at all; and that pleasure is not a mere bodily or sensual emotion, as the satisfying some animal want, but a mental state, Æxiês. He regards pleasure, in its best sense, as 'the crowning finish or zest attending good actions,' and as in its own turn tending to improve them, just as a painter paints best, or a musician plays best, who takes a hearty interest in his art.

The highest happiness, according to Aristotle, consists in 'the best working of the best faculty,' i.e. the mind; and therefore in theoφητική, Thinking or Contemplation.

Moral virtues, he argues, come next, but are only secondary, as a source and cause of happiness, because they depend more on external circumstances. Moreover, moral virtues, such as justice or temperance, are but human, whereas Mind is divine. And thus the theoφητικός, or Thinker, being the most god-like, is most sure to be theoφιλής, the favourite of heaven.

The value of teaching in the acquisition of virtue revives the old question, εἰ διδακτῶν ἀρετή. Aristotle thinks this can only be done nationally and generally by sound principles of legislation; and he concludes with reflections, closely allied to the congenial subject of the Politics, on the nature of νομοθετική, accompanied by some disparaging remarks on the pretensions of the Sophists, whose shallow theories and false notions of politics as a science he lashes as severely as Plato himself has done.
II. **PERI** δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἄδικας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποιὰς τε τυχάνουσιν οὐσαὶ πράξεις, καὶ ποιὰ μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῖνων μέσον. Ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἤμων ἐστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς 5 προειρημένοις. Ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξω βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἢ πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἢ δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἄδικας, ἀφ' ἢ ἄδικοις καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. Διὸ καὶ ἦμων 10 πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν

I. We must now consider the subject of Justice and Injustice,—to what kind of actions they are related, in what sense the virtue of justice is a ‘mean state,’ and between what extremes that which is just holds the middle place.¹ And let one investigation pursue the same course 5 as in the foregone discussions. We see then that all are disposed to call Justice “the kind of mental state by which men are made capable of doing just acts, and as the result of which they not only actually do, but even desire to do what is just.” In the same way they speak about injustice, as “the habit by which men do wrong, and choose to do what is wrong.” Let us, therefore, on our 10 parts take these definitions to begin with, as a general

¹. Whether between two opposite vices, (as bravery is the mean between cowardice and reckless daring) or between two acts of the same kind, i.e. both unjust, inf. chap. 9, ad init.
outline of the subject. (I say a general outline: for the case is by no means the same with the sciences and the faculties, as it is with the habits. A faculty or a science appears to be the same for the opposite results; but a habit of one sort does not give rise to effects of a contrary nature; thus, from a state of health actions of an opposite kind are not produced, but only such as are healthy; for we say a man has a vigorous healthy step when he walks as a healthy man would walk.

Now in many cases the contrary habit is known to us from its contrary; very often too the habits are known from the conditions they exhibit. Thus, if we see clearly what a sound state of body is, we thereby attain a correct idea of an unsound state. So also from the conditions of good health we come to know what good health is, and conversely, from good health we understand what are the conditions of it. To illustrate this: if good health is a

1. ἔχει is used impersonally, as if he had said ἄλλως ἔχει, &c.
2. e.g. a physician who can cure, can also kill; a sophist who can prove a certain view to be right, can also prove it to be wrong, &c.
3. Thus what injustice is may be known by observing the nature of just acts; and from just conduct we know what justice is, as from a
καὶ τὴν καχεῖαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐνεκτικόν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητον ἐν σαρκὶ.

Ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἓν ὀστέα πλεονάχως λέγηται, καὶ ὀστέα πλεονάχως λέγεσθαι, ὅπως εἰ 5 τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. Π. Ἔσοικε δὲ πλεονάχως λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὀμωνύμιαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ ὁνὴ ὀσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω πῆλη μᾶλλον ἡ γὰρ διαφορα πολλὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἱδέαν, ὅπως ὅτι καλεῖτο ταῖς ὀμωνύμιοις ἡ τε ὑπὸ τῶν αὐχένα τῶν ἔων

firmness and plumpness of flesh, then it follows that a bad state of health must be flabbiness of flesh; and what causes good health is whatever makes plumpness in the flesh.

Now it follows generally, that if words of one kind are used in several senses, the contrary or corresponding words have likewise several meanings: for example, if the just, then 5 also the unjust. II. But it does appear that Justice and Injustice are used in divers senses; only, through the meanings comprised under each term being closely alike, they escape our notice, and are by no means as clear as in things widely different. For the difference is considerable when it is generic, as is shown, for instance, by the fact that we use the same word κλεῖς to designate the clavicle just 10 below the neck in animals, and the instrument which

clear view of justice we decide whether actions are just. If paying your debts is justice, then injustice must be the non-payment of them, &c. Compare Hor. Sat. ii. 2, 71, "variae res ut nocent homini, credas memor illius esce Quae simplex olim tibi sederit."

1. ὀμωνύμια is 'a calling by the same name things really different.' If this homonymy is σῶψεγγυς, a close one, i. e. where the things differ very little, the difference is the less likely to strike us. Mr. Williams renders it, "Because the shades of meaning vary so slightly."

2. Perhaps we should read ὃς ὀσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω, ὃ δῆλη μᾶλλον. The ὃ was mistaken for ὅ, and so was omitted.

3. i. e. in things called by one term, when the senses conveyed by the term are wholly distinct in their kind and class.
people use for fastening doors. Let it therefore be clearly ascertained, in how many senses The unjust man is spoken of.\(^1\) Now it is admitted that the law-breaker is unjust, and also the man who takes more than his share, and generally, the unfair man; so that it is clear\(^2\) the just man too will be one who acts by the law, and one who is fair in his dealings. Therefore, justice is 'what is lawful and fair,' injustice, 'what is unlawful and unfair.' But then we said that the unjust man 'took more than his share:' and if so, it must be in such things as are good,—not indeed in all kinds of good, but in such as fall under the head of luck or ill-luck,—the sort of good, that is, which, speaking generally, is always good, though to a particular person it may not be always so.\(^3\) And yet men pray for

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1. i.e. And then it will also be seen how many senses the term δικαῖος has.

2. *Viz.* as 'contrary is known from contrary.' It will be observed that Aristotle does not give a contrary term to πλεονέκτης, since μειονέκτης is not an attribute of a just man, but of an unjust one, if he gets, for instance, less than his fair share of trouble or expense in any transaction. The following passage is intended to show somewhat fully, why μειονέκτης could not be used as an antithetical term, but why 'unfair' is sufficiently comprehensive to correspond to 'fair' as the attribute of the just man. For this reason I have removed the brackets in which Bekker has inclosed καλ δ ἄνισος.

3. For wealth, bravery, beauty, &c. may prove even fatal to their possessors. A man is not called πλεονέκτης for having too large a share of ἀρετή, but only if he has too much money, or land, or credit in some transaction, beyond his deserts.
good things of this kind, and make them the objects of pursuit, though they ought not. Rather, they should pray that things generally good may be so to themselves, and make those things only matters of choice which are really good for them.\(^1\) Not indeed that your unjust man always wishes to have more than his share: he sometimes prefers the less, in things which are absolutely bad.\(^2\) Still as even a less share of evil seems, in a sense, a good, and the 'desire for more' means 'for more good,' therefore he is regarded as one who takes more than his due share. He is, at all events, unfair; (and this term will suffice to describe him;) for it includes the others,\(^3\) and is common to both alike.

III. Now, as we said that the law-breaker was unjust, and he who acted by the law was just, it is clear that everything that is laid down by the law is in a sense just.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) e.g. They may choose or wish for good health, but should pray that riches may not prove baneful. This passage,—if it be not the interpolation of some Christian commentator—illustrates Aristotle's way of running on from point to point, so as to lead the reader occasionally away from the true thread of the argument, which has to be resumed somewhat further on.

\(^2\) i.e. in things which no circumstances can make good. Since then ἄδικος may be a μειονέκτης, we cannot use this term, (as above remarked,) in opposition to πλεονέκτης and make it an attribute of δίκαιος. In fact, a πλεονέκτης may be a μειονέκτης.

\(^3\) Both πλεονέξια and μειονέξια. "This being an inclusive and common term," Chase.

\(^4\) He afterwards shows that 'equity' is a correction of the injustice...
tâ te γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκαστὸν τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. Οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεῖσθαι περὶ ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῆς συμφέρουσας πάσης ἢ τοῖς ἀριστοῖς ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλου τυχαὶ τρόπου τοιοῦτοι ὡστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνία. Προστάτευτε δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου έργα τοιεῦν, οἴον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἴον μὴ μοιχεύων μηδ' ὦβριζεν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἴον μὴ τύ-}

For, as we say that all which has been defined by the legislature is legal, so every one of the points so defined we aver to be just. Now the laws make their declarations on all matters of human action taken as a whole,¹ and in doing so they aim either at what is the common interest of all, or at that of the aristocracy, or that of the governing body, in respect of virtue, or in some such other way.² There is therefore a sense in which we say those things are just, which tend to produce or to preserve their happiness, and the various conditions which constitute happiness, for the social community. Now the law orders us to do the actions of the brave man, as in not leaving the ranks in battle, nor running away, nor throwing away one's shield; of the temperate man, as in not fornicating nor committing outrages; and of the humane and gentle,⁴ in not striking

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¹. *peri πάς* would have meant, that there is nothing about which the laws do not speak.
². The laws aim at making either all, or certain classes, more virtuous, or more useful, or more happy, &c. "Taking virtue for the standard" is the meaning given by the Translators. Jelf construes κάρα κατ' ἀρετὴν, 'holding office for merit.'
³. viz. because they are legal, or recommended or enforced by the laws.
⁴. Hence these actions, as φυλακτικὰ or ποιητικὰ of general welfare, become 'just,' i.e., the duty of all.
πτευν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοιός δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοιχηρὰς τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δὲ ἀπαγορευῶν, ὡρθὸς μὲν ὀ κελευνος ὡρθὸς, χείρον δ’ ὅ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. Ἄντι μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ 5 τελεία, ἅλλ’ οὖν ἀπλῶς ἄλλα πρὸς ἑτέρου. Καὶ διὰ τότῳ πολλάκις κατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ’ ἐστερικοὶ οὔθ’ ἐφόσον οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φαμεν ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλληφθήν τοῦ ἀρετῆ ἐν.
καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τελεία τῆς ἀρετῆς χρή-
10 σις ἐστίν. Τελεία δ’ ἐστίν, ὅτι ὃ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς

others nor abusing them. And so with the rest of the virtues and the vices,—it bids us do one kind of actions and forbids another kind, rightly, when the law itself is rightly laid down, but in a less satisfactory way when it is extemporised. This kind of justice then, though it is complete and perfect virtue in itself, is not so as a mere principle, but as exercised towards another. And it is for this reason that justice is often considered the best of the virtues, and 'more admired than either evening or morning star.' Thus too we are wont to say as a proverb, 'All virtue is centered in justice.' And we call it complete and perfect virtue for this special reason, that the practice of virtue has its own end and object; and its end, because

1. Or, passed to meet some sudden emergency—"made at haphazard" (Williams).
2. Not viewed merely in respect to the possessor of it, but in its effects towards others. The very notion of justice is relative. A man exercises no virtue in not beating, if there is no one to beat, &c. By τελεία ἀρετῆ is meant virtue in respect of its end and aim, to make men good; ἀρετή is mere virtue, in its simplest sense, irrespective of works actually done, or of any end in view; ἀρετῆ is complete virtue, or duty to God, your neighbour, and yourself; not merit or abstinence in one thing, and not in another.
3. i.e. of the four cardinal virtues, perhaps.
4. "Because it is the practice of perfect virtue," the "Translators"; preferring the reading τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρήσεις ἐστι.
one who possesses it can exercise his virtue in relation to another, and not only by himself. (And that this is a real difference, appears from this;) many persons can employ the virtue they have in their domestic affairs, while in their relations with others they are unable to do so. For this reason the saying of Bias is thought to be correct. What a man really is, will be seen when he holds office; for 5 when a man is in office, he at once has relations to another and takes part in the body politic. For this same reason too justice alone of the virtues is considered to be a good belonging to another, because it has its relation in and to another; inasmuch as the just man does that which is to the interest of another, either a ruler or a fellow-member of the state. As therefore that man is the basest who employs his vice against both himself and his friends, so 10 he is the best who employs his virtue not for himself only but for another; for to act in this way is difficult. This kind of justice then is not merely a part of virtue; it is

1. The τέλος is ἄτερος not αὐτός, or in other words, the τέλος of ἄρετῆ is χρήσει πρὸς έτερον.
2. Soph. Antig. 177. ἀμφί οὖν ὅποιός ἄνδρος ἑκαμβεῖν ὁμοίως τε καὶ φρόνημα καὶ γνώμη, πρὸν ἄν
3. For χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ, according to the proverb; and the merit is enhanced by the very difficulty of a task.
v. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

IV. But what we are looking for is the sort of justice which is related to spirit as a part to the whole; for there is such a kind of justice, as we assert. So also with respect to the injustice which is of a partial kind. And the proof that this is so lies in the fact, that a man may act according to all other forms of vice, and so do wrongly, but yet make no direct gain; as in the case of one who throws away his shield through cowardice; one who speaks ill of another through ill-temper; one who refuses to aid...

1. Bekker punctuates, ἣ δὲ regulation of the principles of social life, and as contained under ἀριστεία, ἄρετη.
2. i. e. "as a subdivision of ἀρετή when viewed as a habit of mind." Jelf.
by money, through illiberality. But when he gains an
 undue profit, perhaps he acts in accordance with none of the
 above vices, still less according to all of them, but yet
 according to a certain kind of depravity (for we reprobate
 it), and therefore unjustly. Hence there must be another
 kind of injustice, which is as a part of the whole, and
 something that is ‘unjust’ which forms a part only of that
 5 general ‘unjust’ which involves a breach of law. Again,
 if one man attaches himself to a woman for the sake of
 gain, and because he is paid for it, and another, who has to
 pay for it and so to lose money, through desire; this
 latter may fairly be considered lecherous rather than
 covetous, but the former dishonest, \(^1\) though not wanting in
 self-control; it is clear therefore, that if he acts wrongly, he
 does so through love of gain. Further; in the case of all
 10 other wrong-doings whatsoever, \(^2\) the reference is always to
 some special vice; for example, if a man fornicates, to
 lechery; if he leaves his comrade in the thick of the fight,
 to cowardice; if he strikes another, to anger; but, if he has

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1. As a πλεονέκτης. The same crime has a different name when it is from πλεονεξία.
2. That is, such as do not result committed from love of gain.
in view his own particular profit, to no other vice except that of dishonesty. From all which considerations it is clear, that there is a kind of injustice, beside the general inclusive sort, other than it and partial, though called by the same name, because the definition of it turns on the same kind of actions.¹ Both kinds have their effect in relation to another; only the special sort² is concerned with honour, or goods, or personal safety, (or whatever one term there may be under which we may comprise all these) and results from the pleasure that accrues from gain; while the other sort relates to all those failings collectively, which the good man is concerned in avoiding.³

V. It is clear then that there are several sorts of justice, and another kind of it beside complete virtue; and what that is, and the nature of it, must now be ascertained. Now the unjust has been divided into that which is illegal and that which is unfair;⁴ as justice is that

1. τὰ ψεκτὰ, he seems to mean, or τὰ ἀδίκα. "Since its definition involves the same generic quality," Mr. Williams.

2. The partial sort which is some form or other of πλεονεξία. Even the leaving a comrade unsupported in the fight, which is δείλα, is also πλεονεξία in respect of a man preferring his own safety.

3. Or, ‘to which the action of the good man has reference.’ This sort, of course, is ἄνη ἀδίκα.

4. Or, ‘what transgresses the law, and what violates equality.’
which is legal and fair. The first-mentioned sort, then, of injustice (the general,) comprises that which violates the law. But, as what violates the law is not the same as, but different from, what is unfair,¹ in the same way as the whole differs from a part, (for though all that is unfair is against the law, yet it does not follow that all violation of law is unfair²); so too what is unjust, and injustice in the abstract (in relation to the unfair) are not the same, but different from those other sorts,³ [for] the former are as parts, the latter as a whole: for this kind of injustice (the unfair) is a part of whole, or entire, injustice, and in like manner this kind of justice is a part of the justice which includes all virtue.

We have now therefore, to speak both about particular justice, and also particular injustice; and about the just and the unjust under the same conditions. For the present

¹. c. g. δικαια is different from πλεονεξια. For παρανομον, here and in the following parenthetical clause, most of the editors and translators read πλεον.

². Just as all cheese is milk, but not all milk is cheese, The reader will bear in mind that τὸ παράνομον is δικαία throughout this argument.

³. Ἡδικα from the ἄδικον and ἄδικα περὶ τὸ παράνομον. For τὰ μὲν in what follows perhaps we should read τὰ μὲν γὰρ. The argument is rather complex and obscure. It is intended to prove that there is a partial injustice, ἡ περὶ τὸ ἄνισον, differing from complete injustice, ἡ περὶ παράνομον, and yet included in it, as the minor in the major.
then, let that kind of justice and injustice be dismissed, which ranks with general virtue,—the one being the practice of general virtue in relation to another, the other, that of vice. It is clear therefore that we must also set apart the discussion of the just and the unjust that refer to general virtue or vice; for we can hardly be wrong in saying that in general the requirements of the law are such actions as are done as the result of general virtue; since the law bids us live in accordance with each virtue severally, and forbids us to live in the practice of the several vices.

Now the measures that are productive of general virtue are those legislative enactments which are directed to the subject of general education. The question of particular education, by which a man is made merely good,—whether this belongs to social science or some other, we must separate and leave for future discussion; for perhaps it is

1. This seems the sense of διοριστέων. Mr. Williams renders it, “Nor is there any doubt as to the determination of that which is just and of that which is unjust with reference to this kind of justice and of injustice.”

2. He means, I think, “We may dismiss τὸ δικαιόν and pass on to τὸ ἐν μέρει, because, as the law says, we must be virtuous in every virtue, so the νομίμων becomes ἀλη ἁρετή, as the τὸ παράνομον is ὕλη ἄδικα.” We may leave to the general direction of law the practice and definition of ordinary goodness, and pass on to discuss more special and particular cases.

3. ἀπλῶς, viz. οὐ ὑπὸ ἐπερεῖν,—the abstract virtue of theory and education, rather than that of social practice and intercourse.

4. Or, “we must determine afterwards.”

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not the same thing in every case to be simply a good man and to be a good citizen.

Now of the abstract justice of the particular sort, and the just that is conformable with it, one kind is that which has its exercise in the distributions of honour or wealth or whatever other things can be shared in by the members of a state (for in these it is possible for one man to have from another what is fair or unfair), and another kind is that which is corrective in business transactions. And in this latter kind there are two parts: for of transactions between two parties some are voluntary and some involuntary. Examples of those which are voluntary (on both sides) are, selling and buying, lending and borrowing money, giving securities, loans, deposits, hiring and letting; and they are called voluntary, because the motive for such transactions is voluntary. Of those dealings which involve non-consent,
some are stealthy, as theft, adultery, drugging, seduction, kidnapping, slaying with treachery, false evidence; others imply violence, as assault and battery, putting in bonds, death, robbery, maiming, defamation, insulting language.

VI. Well, since we said that the unjust man was unfair, and the unjust act an unfair act, it is clear that there must be some standard mean of the unequal. And this standard is what is fair (i.e. equal): for in whatever action there is a ‘too much’ and a ‘too little,’ there must also be an equal. If therefore what is unjust is what is unequal, what is just must be what is equal; and this proposition all accept without further argument. And, since what is equal is the mean, what is just will also be a kind of mean. But the notion of equal involves two terms at least. Now what is just, being fair or equal, must also be a mean both in relation to something and to some persons; and in so far as it is a mean, it is so between certain things, (that is to say, between too much and too little), while as fair or equal

1. Or abduction,—the securing of a person for an immoral purpose.
2. ἰσος is ‘unfair’ because ‘unequal’; what is ‘unequal’ to something else requires a standard by which it may be adjusted.
3. Since ἰσος is δικαιον.
it is so to two persons, [and as just, it is so in respect of certain things.] 1 It follows hence, that the just must involve four terms at least; 2 for the persons to whom so-and-so is just, are two, and the matters in dispute are two. And there will be the same relative equality in the persons and in the terms; for as the latter are, 3 viz. the terms, so also the former are. If they, the persons, are not equal, they will not have equal shares; in fact, it is from this cause that all the fightings and the claims arise, viz. either when equal persons have and hold shares not equal, or persons not equal have equal shares. This is yet further made clear from the common expression "according to desert." For all allow that justice in distributions ought to be according to some

1. Justice is μέσον between more and less, and in relation to persons, A and B, it is also ἴσον. Being therefore both μέσον and ἴσον, it involves four terms; "John shall have one bushel, Charles shall have two," in proportionate equality; or, "John shall have one and a half, and Charles one and a half also," if the equality is absolute, or if unfair division has to be set right.

2. I cannot help thinking this last clause is an interpolation; for it would make the terms not four but six. Bekker includes in brackets καὶ πρὸς τι just above, which Mr. Williams renders "it will involve reference to a standard." Both he and Mr. Chase, with Jelf, render ἱ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν, 'as far as it is just, it is so to certain (i.e. to two) persons.' This, as it seems to me, leaves the preceding δυού very ambiguous. Jelf renders it 'absolute equality between two things;' viz. in catallactic justice.

3. For ἔκεινα read, perhaps, ταῦτα. In κάκεινα, for which κακεῖνα would be more correct, the persons seem also viewed as things or claims, to put the four terms in the same general category.
standard of merit: but not all persons agree on the same rate for supplying that standard: for democrats say that it is freedom,\(^1\) oligarchs, that it is wealth; others that it is noble birth, aristocrats, that it is mental and bodily superiority. Hence it appears that justice is a proportionate thing; for proportion is a property not only of numbers reckoned by units,\(^2\) but of any number of things generally, proportion being an equality of ratios, and consisting of four terms at least. Therefore it is clear that proportion in separate terms\(^3\) involves four at least, and so indeed does continuous proportion; for it adopts one term as two, and expresses it twice, e.g. as \(A\) is to \(B\), so is \(B\) to \(C\). Therefore the term \(B\)\(^4\) is expressed twice; so that if the relation of \(B\) be laid down twice, the proportions will be four.\(^5\) But we said that the just also consisted of not less than four terms, and the same may be

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1. That every free man has an equal right.
2. E.g. that \(2:4::6:12\), where cyphers or figures only are used to express the relation of terms. Proportion also may mean that one man has five, another ten, sheep, or a man has five shillings, a boy half-a-crown, &c. &c.
3. Or discrete proportion.
4. "the proportion of \(B\)," or its proportional relation.
5. For \(B\) in itself contains two relations of comparison or equality.
BOOK V.] ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [CHAP. VII.

tous, kal ο λόγος ὁ αὐτός διήρηται γὰρ ὀμολογος, ός τε καὶ ᾗ. Ἐπισταὶ ἄρα ὅς ὁ άρος πρὸς τὸν β, ούτως ὁ γ ρος τὸν δ, καὶ ἑναλλάξ ἄρα, ὅς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν δ. Ωστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἦ 5 νομὴ συνδύασε καὶ ούτω συνετθῇ, δικαίως συνδύασε.

VII. Ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἦ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διαυομη δίκαιον ἐστὶ, καὶ μέσον τὸ δικαιον τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον τὸ γάρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. Καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτι τὴν ἀνάλογαν γεωμετρικὰν οἱ μαθηματικὸν ἐν γάρ τῇ stated of it that is stated about the laws of proportion\(^1\); for there is a like division into persons and things. As therefore the term \(A\) is to the term \(B\), so will the term \(C\) be to the term \(D\); and inversely, as \(A\) is to \(C\), so is \(B\) to \(D\).\(^2\) So that one whole has a proportional relation to the other whole; and this is the very combination which the law of distribution tries to effect;\(^3\) and if the terms are so combined, it effects it rightly.

VII. The coupling therefore of the term \(A\) with the term \(C\), and that of \(B\) with \(D\), is the law of justice in distribution.\(^4\) And this justice is a mean or standard of the injustice which violates proportion; for the right mean is what is in proportion, and justice is that proportion.\(^5\) Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical; for in geometry it is an axiom that the whole is to the whole

1. Or, “and the proportion between the two pairs of terms is the same.”

2. For instance, in distributing prize-money, “as captain \((A)\) is to \(£\,100)\ (C)\), so is sailor \((B)\) to \(£\,5)\ (D).”

3. *Vis.* that captain with his \(£\,100\) shall be on a fair and equal footing, in respect of pay, with the sailor with his \(£\,5\). In the technical rm, \(A + C : B + D :: A : B.\)

4. e.g. as captain to \(£\,100\), so sailor to \(£\,5\).

5. This δίκαιον is ἀνάλογον, and ἀνάλογον is μέσον τοῦ παρά ἀνάλογον. Therefore δίκαιον is μέσον.

If a dispute arises between captain and sailor as to a share of prize-money, the question must be settled by the claims of relative rank; there is no other mean in this case than what is proportionate, or, in other words, what is just and fair to each.

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as either part is to the other part. But this proportion is not continuous; for the 'to whom' and the 'what' (or person and thing) do not form one term in the number.

Justice, then, is this kind of proportion, and injustice is that which violates this proportion. The result, therefore in this case is, that one share is too much, and the other is too little. And this is just what happens in practice; for the man who acts unfairly has too much, and the man who is unfairly treated has too little of the good. In the case of the bad, it is just the other way: for the less evil compared with the greater evil is reckoned as a good. For the less evil is preferable to the greater; and whatever is preferable is (relatively) good, and that which is more so is the greater good.

One kind of justice then is this, (the distributive). The remaining kind is the corrective, which takes place in those dealings and transactions which are voluntary, as well as in those which are involuntary. Now this justice has a

I. e.g. 10 : 20 :: 5 : 10, or 9 : 15 :: 3 : 5. (19)
character different from the former. For the distributive justice, in the case of property common to two or more, always follows the proportion that has been specified (for if the distribution is to be made from a common sum of money, it will be in that same proportion in which the sums contributed bear to each other); and the injustice opposed to this kind of justice, is that which is in violation of proportion. But the sort of justice which has place in business transactions, though it is a kind of equality, (as the injustice is an inequality,) still is not according to that proportion, but according to arithmetic proportion. For it makes no difference whether a respectable man defrauds a dishonest 10 one, or the converse: nor whether it is a good or a bad man who has committed adultery: the law looks only to the difference caused by the harm done; and it treats the

1. And so a kind of relative áxia will exist. ἔχεις should rather be ἔχει, if the meaning given in the Translation is correct. But perhaps we should read διπέρ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἐλεγκταί. The liquidation of a joint-stock bank, and the distribution of effects (if any), or the returning of club-money, ἐπάνω, to the πληρωται or members, would serve to illustrate the sense.

2. It has nothing to do with relative rank or geometric proportion; but you must subtract from one side and add to the other to make ἰσος, as in any case of πλεονεξία.

3. i. e. The loss on one side and the gain on the other.
leo μὲν ἄδικεὶ δὲ ἁδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπ-
ται. "Ωστε τὸ ἄδικον τούτο ἄνισον ὑπὸ ἴσαξεν πειράται
ὁ δικαστὴς· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ
cαὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δὲ ἀποθανή, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις
5 εἰς ἄνισον. ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ ἤξιμῃ ἴσαξεν, ἀφαιρῶν
tοῦ κέρδους. Δέγεται γὰρ ὃς ἀπλῶς εὑπτεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς
tουστοὺς, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος,
οἶν τὸ πατάξαμε, καὶ ἡ ἤξιμα τῷ παθῶντι ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν
γε μετηρῷῃ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ἤξιμα τὸ δὲ κέρ-
10 δος. "Ωστε τοῦ μὲν πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος τὸ ἴσον
μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ἤξιμα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ
ἐλάττων ἐναπτῶς, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ

parties as equals, if one wrongs and the other is wronged,
and if one does and the other suffers loss or harm. This
injustice then is an inequality which the judge endeavours
to adjust; for when one person is struck, and another strikes,
(or even kills and another is killed,) the suffering and the
doing are, in fact, divisions into unequal parts; only the
judge tries to bring them to equality by the penalty, taking
so much away from the side of the gain. (We say, gain;
for the term is used, speaking generally, in cases of this kind,
even though it be not exactly suited to some; for instance,
we talk of the gain in the case of the striker, and of loss in
the case of the sufferer. But at all events, when the case of
the injured has been estimated, the payment is called fine,
and the receiving is called recompense). Thus, between too
much and too little the fair and equal is the mean. But
to gain and loss are respectively a more and a less, only in a
contrary way; that is to say, the more of the good and the
less of the evil is gain, while the contrary,—the less of the

1. Hence the almost proverbial expression τὸ δρᾶμα τοῦ πάθος
πλέον.
2. When the extent of the injury has been ascertained, and one is
made to pay a recompense to the other, then it is a true case of κέρδος
and ἤξιμα.

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good and the more of the evil,—is loss. The mean therefore between these is that equality, which we said was justice.

Corrective justice, then, is the mean between loss and gain. And hence, when men have any dispute, they have recourse to the judge. But to go to the judge is to go to get justice; for the judge professes to be a sort of living justice, and men seek a judge to act between them, and some call them mediators, on the notion that, if they get the mean, they will get justice. Hence justice must be a kind of mean, if, as we say, the judge stands between two claimants. And the duty of the judge is to bring to an equality. It is as if if a line were divided into unequal parts; he takes away that portion of it by which the larger section exceeds the half, and adds it to the smaller section. In fact, whenever a whole is divided into two parts, people say they have got

1. Reading δ ἐλέγομεν for the vulg. δ λέγομεν.
2. The principle of justice embodied in a living interpreter.
3. If to get the middle is to get the fair or equal, then the middle-man (so to say) is the man of fairness, the man of δίκη, or δικαστής.
4. If a line is divided into two parts of five and seven inches respectively, the judge cuts off an inch from the seven and adds it to the five, making each six inches.
what belongs to them when they have got an equal or fair share. And what is *fair* is what is a mean between too great and too little according to arithmetic proportion.  
And for this reason it is called δίκαιον, *just*, because it is in two parts, δίχα, as if one were to say δίχαιον, and to call a judge, δικαστὴς, ‘a divider,’ διχαστῆς. For whenever, of two equals, something is taken from one and added to the other, that other is in excess by twice the amount; for had so much merely been taken away and not added, it would have been in excess only by that single quantity. Hence it exceeds the mean, or standard, by one, and the mean exceeds that from which the quantity was taken, by one.  
By this standard then we shall know what we ought to take from the holder of the more, and what to add to the holder of the less; for that quantity by which the mean exceeds the less, we should add to the holder of too little, and that

1. e. g. six, as a mean between four and eight.

2. It may be doubted if this absurd derivation is really due to Aristotle, or to the author of the Treatise. The passage may well be an interpolation by some one versed in the half-playful etymologies in Plato’s Cratylus.

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by which the mean is exceeded, we should take from the greatest.

Let \( AA, BB, CC \), be equal to each other.\(^1\) From \( AA \)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
A \\
E \\
B \\
C \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
C \\
G \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
D
\]

take \( AE \), and add to \( CC \) the same piece marked \( CD \). Then

the whole \( DCC \) exceeds \( EA \) by both \( CD \) and \( CG \); and

therefore it exceeds \( BB \) by \( CD \).

5 Now the above names, loss and gain,\(^2\) came to us from
the voluntary dealing in commodities: for to have more
than belonged to oneself, is called making a gain; the
having less than at first, a loss, as in buying and selling and
such other transactions as the law sanctions and permits.
But when neither more nor less, but only the same as

\(^1\) \( \alpha l \ \epsilon p i \ \delta \nu (\gamma r a m \mu a l) \), lit. 'the
lines to which the letters \( AA \) &c.
are affixed.' In the next sentence
\( t o \ \epsilon p i \ \sigma o \), not \( t o \ \epsilon p i \ \delta \nu \) seems the
true reading.

\(^2\) Perhaps this passage has been
disarranged from its true position,
which should be after the words
"which we said was justice," in p.
(22). It is preceded by a sentence
wholly out of place here, and oc-
curring afterwards in ch. viii. § 9.
This is also an indication of some
textual disturbance.

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BOOK V.]   ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.  [CHAP. IV.

διαττον ἄλλα ἤαυτὰ δ' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ ὁποῖές ζημιούσθαι ὁππεδείν ἰστε ἐρέσσους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιον ἐστὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἕκοινον, τὸ ἱσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ υστερον.

5 VIII. δοκεῖ δὲ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὡσπέρ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἐφασαν ὁρίζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός ἄλλο. Τὸ δ' ἀντίπεπονθός οὐκ ἑφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον

before, then they say they have what belongs to them, and neither lose nor gain. So that this corrective justice is the mean between a gain and a loss which are incidental to action where no consent has been given, that is to say, it is the having the same amount both before and after the transaction.

5 VIII. There is another kind of justice, which some accept as the simplest form of it, viz. retaliation. And so the followers of Pythagoras stated it, for they defined justice generally to be, 'something suffered or received for something else done.' Yet this law of reciprocity does not suit either the distributive kind of justice or the corrective: though indeed they are disposed to say this also of the

1. The words αὐτὰ δ' αὐτῶν or (αὐτὰ δ' αὐτῶν) are corrupt. They cannot mean, as Jelf interprets them, "self-contained," "not encroaching on each other, but equal." Nor is it likely that δ' αὐτῶν means 'by buying and selling,' as Mr. Williams renders it. Perhaps, αὐτὰ τὰ αὐτῶν, 'merely their own,' i.e. merely what they had before the transaction, as in buying a house a man may neither lose nor gain, but get a fair equivalent for his money.

2. In such cases as assault and battery, where one party at least does not consent to the action.

3. The Jewish law of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." It is the oft repeated δράσαντι παθεῖν of Eschylus, and is a simpler and easier rule of justice than exacting an equivalent in the way of a fine &c.

4. Lit. 'when applied to either' &c.

5. Or, 'they would have it that the justice of Rhadamanthys means this.' They quote, as the highest definition of true justice, the law of practice, attributed to the judge in the other world, and say it is ἀπλῶς δίκαιον. Aristotle seems to mean that, at best, this is not perfect or complete justice, but only a form or kind of it, suited to certain circumstances, but wholly inapplicable to others.

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BOOK V.] ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [CHAP. VIII.

οὔτ' ἔπει τὸ διορθωτικὸν καὶ τοῖς βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον
εἰ κε πάθοι τὰ κ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἱθεία γένοιτο.

πολλαχοῖ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἶον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν,
οὐ δεὶ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἀρχοῦντα ἐπάταξεν, οὗ
5 πληγήναι μόνον δεὶ ἄλλα καὶ κολασθῆναι. Ἡτα τὸ
ἐκουσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολὺ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν
ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιούτων
δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ'
ισότητα· τῷ ἀντιποιείν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις.

10 Ἡ γὰρ τὸ κακὸς ἡττοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, δουλελα δοκεῖ εἴναι,
εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, μεταδοσίς οὐ
gνέται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. Διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων

justice of Rhadamanthys, 'If a man suffereth the same as he hath done, then will there be right recompense.' In fact, it differs in many respects from the above kinds of justice. For instance, if a man in office strikes (an inferior), he ought not to be struck in return; whereas, if (a subordinate) strikes an officer, he ought not only to be struck, but to be punished for it. Besides, it makes a great difference whether a wrong is intentional or accidental. But in business-dealings generally this (the reciprocal) sort of justice is the true bond of unison, 'the getting as much in return,' but in a relative proportion, and not in actual equality. For it is by the reciprocity that takes into account the relative value of things, that society is held together. For men seek either the right to inflict a proportionate harm (and if they cannot do this, it seems to them a servile state of subjection,) or to do some good in return; for otherwise no exchange of commodities takes place, and it is by such exchange that they continue in mutual fellowship. And this is why they set a

1. vis. as is the case in simple εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει is a gloss on εἰ ἀντιπεπονθός.

3. And thus συμμένει ἡ πόλις, μὴ

It seems likely that the clause sup.

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5 as thus: A is a householder, B is a shoemaker, C is a house, D is a pair of shoes. Well, the housebuilder has to receive from the cobbler some of his work, and on his part to give
him some of his own. If then the proportional equality of these commodities be first established, and then the reciprocity takes place, the sort of justice we speak of will be realised. But if the values have not been so ascertained, no fair equivalent exists, and no bargain of this kind can be binding.

5 For there is nothing to prevent one man’s work being of a better kind than the other’s; hence these must be brought to some standard of equality. And this is true also of the other arts; for they would be destroyed, unless what the producer produced, and of what quality and in what quantity, that same commodity, in the same kind and amount, the consumer consumed. For a bargain is not made when two physicians are the parties, though it may be made between a physician and a farmer; and generally, transactions are between men of different and not of the same

1. The δίκαιον κατ’ ἀναλογίαν.
2. If the relative value of a sheep and of a bushel of wheat be mere guess-work, men will not attempt to barter; or, if they do, one or the other side is sure to be dissatisfied.
3. Or, as we say, their trade-values must be known.
4. Unless the producer and the consumer had a relation to each other. If all tradesmen made shoes, and nothing else, the trade would soon die a natural death, because produce would exceed demand. To bring this view under the head of ‘reciprocity,’ he uses ὁ πᾶσχων as the correlative of ὁ ποιῶν, meaning the receiver, or consumer, and the maker. For, as Plato says in the Theætetus, a ποιῶν implies a πᾶσχων, and the converse. Mr. Williams omits this sentence, perhaps rightly.
BOOK V. | ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [CHAP. VIII.

Διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, διὸ ἑστὶν ἀλλαγῆ. 'Εφ' δὲ τὸ νόμιμον ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὡστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλλειψιν, τόσα ἀττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἵσον οἰκία ἢ τροφῆ. 5 Δεὶ τούτων ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαθὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφῆν. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὔδὲ κοινωνία. Τούτῳ δ', εἰ μὴ ἰσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. Δεὶ ἄρα ἐν τιν πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὡστερ ἐλέξῃ πρότερον. Τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἢ 10 χρεία, ἢ πάντα συνέχει: εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιτο ἢ μὴ trades. Only, that there may be dealings, it is necessary that these\(^1\) should be put to some standard of equality. Consequently all things which men trade in ought to be in some way capable of being compared. It is for this purpose that a currency has been introduced, and is made in a manner a medium; for it is the measure of all things, and therefore of excess and deficiency; of course, therefore, how many pairs of shoes are an equivalent for a house, or for so much food. Hence now the same relation of worth 5 should subsist between the housebuilder and the cobbler, as between so many pairs of shoes and a house or so much food.\(^2\) For if there is not this relation, there will be no exchange and no dealing. And there cannot be this relation, unless the things are put on some footing of equality. Therefore, all things ought to be measured by some one 10 standard, as was before stated. And this, in fact, is demand,\(^3\) which is the sustaining principle of all exchange. For, if men did not want at all, or not one as much as another, there

1. The ἐπεροι, if not ἵσοι, must be made relatively ἵσοι.
2. Perhaps, δεὶ τολύν, διερ οἰκοδό-
    μος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον ἢ γεωργίας,
    τοσαθὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν εἶναι ἢ ἐ
    τροφῆν. The comparative relation of
    one tradesman to another means the
    smaller or larger value he charges
    for the exercise and the products of
    his craft; which again depends on the
    time and skill employed. This must
    be the meaning of the proportion,
    Farmer: sculptor :: turnip: bust.
3. What really proves the true
    worth or value of a thing, is the
    demand that exists for it; since a
    thing is worthless that nobody
    wants.

(29)
would either not be barter at all, or not the same as there now is. And thus the currency spoken of has become a kind of representative of the demand by common agreement; and for this reason money is called a legal tender, because it does not exist naturally, but only by law, and it is in our power to change and make it of no service. And thus there will be reciprocity, when commodities have been so equalized, that what the farmer is to the shoemaker that the work of the shoemaker is to the work or produce of the farmer. But they must bring the commodities into some form of relative proportion, when they are going to deal in them; otherwise, the one extreme will involve both the excesses. But when men get their own, they are thus on an equality; and they have dealings, because this equality is too much, and the other will get too little; and the excess and deficiency together will double the injustice done. The standard line here will be the νόμισμα or currency. If two people are bartering goods worth £1, on each side, the person who receives for his the value of 15s. is not 5s. but twice 5s. worse off than the person who gets 25s. This, of course, is equally true of different and relative values. Mr. Williams paraphrases the passage thus: "After,
able to be established in their case. Let $A$ represent a farmer, $C$ a quantity of corn, $B$ a shoemaker, and $D$ his work, brought to an equal measure with $C$. And unless it were possible to reciprocate in this way, there could be no dealing. And that it is the demand on each side that unites them in trading, so as to form as it were, one motive, is shown by the fact that, when they do not stand in need of each other, (either both or one of them,) they do not trade, as they do when some one wants what another himself possesses, say, wine, giving some corn in exchange for export. This therefore must be made equal to the other. As for future trading, if one does not want a thing at present,—this money-currency is a kind of security to us that it shall take place whenever one does want: for it is right and proper that, when he brings the money, he shall get the goods. (No

however, that the exchange has once taken place, the parties must not be represented as being still in a relation of mutual superiority and inferiority, or otherwise the one of the terms will be having an allowance made for its superiority twice over, and in two distinct ways." I am not sure I understand his meaning aright. The student will find a discussion of this passage in No. 7 of the Journal of Philology, p. 151.

1. The word ἕξαγωγή seems well-nigh unintelligible. I think it has been inserted by some one who did not understand the passage, to explain the genitive σίτου, which is partitive, i.e. depends on μέρος τι understood. The construction is, ὅσπερ ἄλλαττον, διδότες σίτου, οὔτας δένται ὅλος ἔχει αὐτός, οἷον οἶνον. Mr. Williams’ version is, "and gives for it a portion of an export of corn;" but I do not think this is tenable; nor Dr. Jeff’s "some of the produce of his fields."
doubt, even a money-currency, is liable to the same fluctuations, for it is not always of the same value: nevertheless, it has a tendency rather than other things to remain the same.) Therefore all commodities should have a money-value set on them; for so there will at any time be exchange, and if so, then there will be dealing. This coinage then is as it were a measure, which by making things commensurable reduces them to relative equality. For as, if there were no exchange there could be no trading, so there could be no exchange if there were no equality, and no equality if there were no means of making things commensurable. (In reality, of course, it is impossible for things so variable to have any common measure; but for the requirements of trade this is possible in a degree that is sufficient.) There must then be some one standard, and that by general assumption; whence it is called a legal tender, this being the thing that makes all commodities commensurable, since all are measured by some recognized standard.

Thus, let $A$ be a house, $B$ ten minae, $C$ a sofa. Then

1. Or, 'so differing in value.'
2. Or 'standard currency,' ρόμισμα.
A is half $B$, if a house is worth five minae; or an equivalent value. But the sofa, $C$, is a tenth part of the value of $B$. Hence it is clear how many sofas are equivalent to a house, that is to say, five. And that exchange took place thus before a standard currency was introduced, is clear; for it makes no real difference whether five sofas are paid for a house, or the value of five sofas.

IX. What then the unjust is, and what the just, has been stated. And now that these have been separately defined, it is evident that honest dealing is a mean between wrongdoing and being wronged; for one is the having too much, the other, the having too little. But the principle of justice is a mean state, not in the same way with the virtues discussed before, but because it takes the place of a mean, while injustice takes the place of opposite extremes. And the virtue of honesty is that by which the most virtues the mean is between opposite extremes, (e.g. bravery between cowardice and reckless daring,) justice is a mean between an injustice at both ends, since both getting too much and getting too little are alike unfair.
honest man is said to be disposed by choice to do what is honest, and to distribute what is fair and just both to himself with another, and to another with a third party,—that is, in such a way as not to award too much of the choice-worthy to himself, and too little to another, and in the converse way in respect of the harmful,—but so as to award what is fair to himself by the law of proportion, and so to another as compared with another. And injustice on the contrary is the disposition to award what is unfair, and that is an excess and deficiency of the beneficial or the hurtful contrary to proportion. And this is why injustice is ‘excess and deficiency,’ because it is a fault on the side of excess and deficiency,—in one’s own case, of excess of what is in itself beneficial, and of deficiency in what is harmful; in the case of others the whole act is the same as in the case of oneself; but where proportion is violated, it is in whichever way it may chance to be. And in the

1. As in the case of a college-bursar awarding different sums to himself, to the master, to the senior and to the junior members of a college.

2. i.e. not in the direction of self-interest only. Too much or too little of good or bad is given in proportion to the rank or just claims of the recipient. Mr. Chase translates
particular act of injustice, the having too little is being wronged, and the having too much is doing a wrong to another.

With respect then to justice and injustice, and what the nature of each of them is, let the above method of treatment be considered as sufficient; and so too respecting what is just and what is unjust generally.

5 X. Now, since it is possible for a man who does wrong not yet to have the habit of injustice; we may ask, What sort of wrong actions must a man do, to be regarded as already vitious in each kind of wrong-doing? For instance, in the case of a thief, an adulterer, or a robber? Or is there no difference, looking to the acts only? For
he may have connexion with a woman with a full knowledge who she is, and yet not from the motive of deliberate intention, but through passion. If so, he does wrong; but he is not an habitual wrong-doer. So a man is not a thief because he has committed a single theft, just as he is not an adulterer because he has once been guilty of adultery; and so on with the other crimes.

5 The relation of reciprocity to justice has already been described. But we must not forget, that what we are inquiring for is justice pure and simple, and also the justice which consists in the duty of citizen to citizen. And this sort of justice holds in the case of those who have a community of life with a view to independence,—free men, and equal either proportionally or numerically. So that those who have not this social relation, have no social justice, though they have a kind of justice which is called so from its resemblance. For there is justice only where there is

1. "Not deliberately at all," Mr. Williams.
2. i. e. in its simplest and most abstract sense: the δίκαιον by violating which a man is unconditionally δίκως. The 'Ethics' were an introduction to the 'politics,' to which πολιτικόν δίκαιον has reference.
3. Either according to grades of rank, e. g. a baronet is to a baron as an earl is to a duke, or counted simply as so many citizens.
4. e. g. the members of a solitary house would have a kind of δίκαιον, not altogether different from πολιτικόν.
γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτοὺς νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἰδικία: ἥ γὰρ διήθη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἰδικοῦ: Ἐν οἷς δ' ἰδικία, καὶ τὸ ἰδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἰδικεῖν, οὐ πάσῳ ἰδικίᾳ τὸ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ 5 νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. Αἰ δὲ οὐκ έόμεν ἀρχεῖν ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἐαυτῷ τούτῳ ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. Ἐστὶ δ' ὁ ἀρχὴν φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δέ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἱσον. Ἐστὶ δ' οὕτων αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἰπέρ δίκαιος: οὐ 10 γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογον ἐστὶν διὸ ἕτερῳ ποιεῖ καὶ διὰ τούτο

law; and law is for those among whom there is such a thing as injustice: for administrative justice is the determining what is just and what is unjust. Now wherever there is the principle of injustice in a people, there also the wronging each other will occur; but not in all cases where there is wrong-doing is there also the principle of injustice. And by this I mean, the awarding to oneself too much of the simply good, and too little of the simply evil. And this is why we do not allow a man to be the ruler, but only the principle; because a man is apt to rule for himself, and so to become a tyrant. But the ruler is the guardian of what is just, and therefore of what is fair to all alike. Now, as it is presumed that a man does not take too much for himself, if he is really honest; (for he does not award to himself too much of the simply good, unless it belongs to him by some rule of proportion; and therefore he acts for another, and on this account they say

1. The words πρὸς αὐτοῦς I cannot understand, and suspect they are interpolated. The translators render it "mutually acknowledged law;" or "law between man and man."
2. Or, "a distinguishing between the right and the wrong." "Law implies justice because it springs out of cases where a sense of wrong has been felt." Grant.
3. Since a man may wrong another by impulse, ἐδικοῖς ἀν.
4. Ἐις. the tendency to ἰδικία, in self-interest.
5. Ας βασιλεὺς.
that justice is a good exercised for another, as before also was observed;) therefore some remuneration must be given; and this consists in honour and prerogative. And those who are not content with these privileges, become tyrants.

The justice due from a master to a slave, or from a father to his children, is not identical with these,\(^1\) though it is similar. For there can be no injustice done to what is absolutely one’s own; and a chattel and a child (so long as he is of a certain age, and not separated from his father) are in a sense a part of oneself. Now no man deliberately chooses to damage himself; and therefore there can be no injustice against oneself. Thus there is no unjust or just (towards a slave or a son) of the social or political kind; for that was in relation to law,\(^2\) and therefore to those among whom it was natural that there should be law;—and these were they in whom subsisted an equality in ruling and being ruled.\(^3\) For these reasons there is ‘a

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1. i. e. with the justice of citizen to citizen, and of ruler to subject.

2. Whereas a slave and a child have no law but the will of the owner.

3. Both the ruler and the ruled have equality of rights καὶ δικαιο-γιαν. In a τυραννίς the people are supposed to have no rights.
just towards a wife\(^1\) rather than towards children, or to property in slaves; for this is domestic justice,\(^2\) though even this differs from social justice.

Now of political justice one kind is natural, and another kind conventional. That is natural which everywhere has the same force, and does not depend on being considered so or not; but that is conventional which originally was indifferently either in this or in some other way; but is not indifferent when men have made it an enactment: for example, the right to ransom oneself for a mina, or the offering a she-goat and not two sheep; or again, such laws as are made for particular occasions, as the sacrificing to Brasidas,\(^3\) and all matters of special enactment. Some indeed think that all kinds of justice are conventional, because whatever exists by nature is unchangeable and everywhere has the same effects, (as fire burns both here and among the Persians); while they see that men's ideas of justice are constantly changing. Now this

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1. For a wife has some rights, though subject to her husband; there is a kind of σεβασμός between them.
2. Perhaps we should read τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον οἰκονομικὸν.
3. A curious instance of the lateness of ἐναγεμύλων or blood-offerings to the spirits of departed heroes. See Thucyd. V. 11.
is not so, and yet there is a sense in which it is true.\(^1\) It is not so, perhaps, with the gods; but with us mortals there is a sort of natural justice, though in all cases it is liable to change. In spite of this, however, there is a kind of justice which is natural, and another which is not so (but conventional). Now of the sorts of justice which admit of variation, which is natural and which is not so, but only conventional and by common agreement, (both being variable alike,) is (sufficiently) clear.\(^2\) And there are other things beside justice in which the same definition will be found applicable.\(^3\) For naturally the right hand is stronger, and yet it is possible for some persons to attain the faculty of using both hands alike. Now the kinds of justice which are determined by agreement and by notions of utility resemble

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1. It is not true that all δίκαιον is νομικὸν, but it is true that φύσει δίκαιον is variable.

2. It seems to me that we should read either ἄθηλον for δήλον, or εἰ καὶ for εἰπέρ. Since both are equally variable, it is not clear which is natural and which is conventional justice; or, 'It is clear enough in the main which &c. even though they are equally variable.' So Mr. Chase understands it; and it gives a better sense, perhaps, if εἰπέρ could bear such a meaning. Mr. Williams' version is this, but I cannot see how it represents the Greek: "And it is self-evident what kind of things contingent exist by nature, and what kind by positive law and by convention,—although both alike are conceivably variable."

3. Viz. that τὰ φύσει are variable.
the measures which are in use; those for wine and corn are not everywhere the same, but where men buy, they are larger, and where they sell, they are less. In like manner, those kinds of justice which are not natural but human, are not everywhere the same, since neither are the forms of government the same: whereas there is but one typical form all the world over which by nature is the best. Now each variety of this human and conventional justice has the relation of a general to particulars; for the single acts are many, but each of the former is single, for it is a general principle. And the act of injustice differs from the unjust in principle as the act of justice does from the just. For ‘the unjust’ is so either by nature or by command and appointment; and this same ‘unjust,’ when it is carried out in an act, becomes ‘an injustice’; whereas, before it was so

1. If the latter clause be not an interpolation, he seems to mean, that retail measures are often less than the wholesale. Wholesale dealers often have an advantage, as when 13 are counted as 12; while a pint-and-a-half counts as a quart in bottled wines.

2. There may be an ideal or model form of government that we can conceive of as the best everywhere; but, practically, different forms of government are thought the best by different people.

3. ἕκαστον, each rule or accepted principle of justice, differing in different states. Though conventional justice varies in the abstract, still what each state holds to be just must be taken as one unvarying rule, i.e. it is not κυρίων to the government which has sanctioned it.


ARRISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [CHAP. X.

ἀδικον. Ὁμολογεῖ δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. Καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγμα τὸ κοινὸν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπαινόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. Καθ’ ἐκαστὸν δὲ αὐτῶν, ποιά τε ἐνδή καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποιάν τιναξαὶ ὁντα, ὑστερον ἐπιστήμης κεπτέων. Ὅντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἐκῶν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ ὅταν δ’ ἀκον, ὄντε δικεῖ ὑτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἂλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβεβηκε δικαίως
carried out, it was not yet such, but only ‘unjust.’ So also in the case of a just act. [But it is rather called δικαιοπράγμα in common parlance, for δικαίωμα is ‘the correcting of the wrong done]. About these acts however severally,—what are their kinds, how many, and with what matters they are concerned, we will consider on a future occasion.

Assuming then the existence of the sorts of justice and injustice that have been specified, (we proceed to remark that) a man is guilty of an unjust or a just action, when he does these actions with deliberate intention. When he does them without intention, he cannot be said to do either wrong or right, except indeed accidentally. For thus men

1. i. e. wrong in principle. The law says, ‘thou shalt not steal’; this is a principle of justice enunciated as a τάξεις, or rule of action. But each individual κλέμα becomes an ἀδικημα, because κλέμεναι ἀδίκουν, provided the law of any state has so ruled it. So also with φόσιν δίκαια, as not to commit murder.

2. The passage in brackets appears to me a gloss, intended for a comment on the very unusual sense of δικαίωμα. If Aristotle really wrote it, he must mean it as an apology for using δικαίωμα in a convenient but less correct sense. Mr. Williams’ rendering is neat: "The phrase ‘act of righteousness’ is, however, the more general; the term ‘act of right’ being usually restricted to the righting of an actual wrong.” Grant thinks that Eudemus intended here to correct the phraseology of Aristotle.

3. A man who owes a tradesman a pound, and accidentally leaves a sovereign on the counter, which in fact satisfies the debt, does a just action, but without the least credit to himself, since he did not intend at the time to pay the debt.

4. πράττονον, sc. ἀδικος καὶ ὁ δίκαιος.
only do acts which chance to be honest or dishonest. Therefore, a wrong and a right action are determined by the intention or non-intention. For it is only when intentional, that an act incurs blame; and it then becomes also a specific act of injustice. So that there will be such a thing as dishonesty, which is not yet a dishonest act, unless the intention (to wrong) attaches to it. And by intention I mean, as has been before said, ‘whatever of those actions that are under his own control a man does with full knowledge, and not ignorant of either the whom or the wherewith or the why.’ He must know for instance, whom he strikes, and with what instrument, and with what object or result in view; and each of these points must be exempted from mere accident, or from coercion by violence; as, if a person should seize the hand of another and strike with it a third party, the striker would not do the act intentionally, for the striking or not striking was not in his own control. It is

1. I would read ἀδίκημα δὴ κ.τ.λ.
2. As, when a person pays a tradesman too little by mistake, the tradesman is wronged, and there is ἀδίκημα in the transaction, but no ἀδίκημα on the part of the purchaser. (Of course, ἀδίκημα is not limited to dishonesty, which is here taken as a case).
3. A man who kills another by throwing a snowball with a stone in it, must, to be guilty, know (1) That it was a man, not a post that he aimed at. (2) That there was a stone in the snow-ball. (3) That he intended to hurt, and not merely to frighten.
4. “What will be the effect of the blow,” Williams.
possible too that the person struck may be his own father,¹ and that the striker may know that it was a human creature, or some one of the bystanders, but have no idea that it was his father. Let a similar definition hold also of the motive, and about the action as a whole.² Whatever then is unknown, or, if not unknown, is not in a man’s own power, or is done by constraint, is involuntary. Indeed, there are many even of the things which are the natural lot of man that we do or suffer knowingly, and yet none of these can be called either voluntary or involuntary, such as growing old or dying.³ It is the same in the case of accidentality in actions just or unjust.⁴ A man may return a deposit unwillingly, and through fear; but we should not say he was an honest

¹. Which, at least, would greatly aggravate the offence, if he deliberately intended it. Perhaps the case of Ædipus was in the mind of the author.

². Was it intentional, or merely accidental:—ἐπὶ τοῦ κ.τ.λ., lit. ‘on the question for what (purpose),’ i. e. to bring about what result?

³. This sentence is meant to correct the notion, that ἐλθήματι of itself necessarily constitutes ἐκούσιον. There are some acts, he says, which are neutral, and he gives instances of μὴ ἀγνοούμενα, μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δ’ ὄντα. No man ἔκων γνώρισε, nor ἄκων, so far as ἐκούσιον depends on ignorance.

⁴. Among neutral cases may be reckoned things that are only accidentally right or wrong. The translators render ὀμολόγος ‘in unjust equally with just.’

(44)
Oùte dikaiostraphein fátéon állo' h katà svmbéthikós. 'Omoíos de kai tôn ánagkaímeon kai ákonta tôn parakatathékwn hú apodidónta katà svmbéthikós fátéon ádikein kai tā ádika práttein. Tōn de ekousiōn tā méven 5 prōélémenoi práttomev tā dé oú prōélémenoi prōélémenoi méven óssa prōboulēsámenei, áproulētesa dé óssa áproulēsánte. Triōn de óusóin blebdh tôn en tais koivonías, tā méven met' ággolas amartímatá éstw, ótan mýte dun mýte dé mýte f' mýte ou' éneka úpēlabe prágē. h gáre ou 10 balein h ou toútou h ou toútou h ou toútou éneka phýthi, állass svnébhi ou' ou' éneka phýthi, ou' ou' éneka phýthi, ou' ou' éneka phýthi, ou' ou' éneka phýthi, ou' ou' éneka phýthi.

man, or doing an honest deed, except accidentally. So too in the case of one who under constraint and reluctantly refuses to return a deposit; we should say he was guilty of a dishonest act, and was doing unjustly, only by accident.\(^1\)

Now of voluntary acts we do some by deliberate choice, others without choice; in the former case, when we have 5 come to a previous decision, in the latter case without such decision. And as there are three kinds\(^2\) of harm that can occur in men's dealings with each other, those actions which are done in ignorance are mistakes, viz. when a man does something not to the person he intended, or not what he intended, or not with the instrument nor with the effect. He did not intend to strike at all, or not with the 10 weapon he used, or not the person struck, or not with the result which has actually happened. In this case then a result has occurred which he had not thought of,\(^3\) for instance,

1. He had honest intentions, but some one threatened him if he restored it to the owner. The injustice here was ákoston. The act involved injustice, but it was not done through injustice.

2. \textit{Viz.} amartíma, culpable misconduct, áthríma, mishap or mishap.

3. If therefore death ensues, it is katà svmbéthikós, since it was the result of a pure mistake.
he did it not to wound, but only slightly to prick; or he did it not to the person he meant, or not in the way he meant. Whenever therefore the mischief happens contrary to expectation, it is a misadventure: when not unexpectedly, but without malice, it is culpable misconduct. For a man is criminal when the motive of the crime is in himself, but he has a mishap, when it comes from without. But when a man inflicts the harm with knowledge indeed, but not from previous intention, it is an act of wrong, as in all such doings as happen with men from anger or other passions, inevitable or natural to them. Men do indeed commit these misdeeds to the harm of others and from their own fault, and therefore they are guilty of wrong-doing: yet they are not, so far, habitual wrong-doers because of such acts, nor depraved characters; for the mischief was not done from malice to prepense; but when a man does it of deliberate intent, then he is a wicked and unprincipled man.

1. If a person kills another by reckless riding or driving, he is guilty of manslaughter, though there was no evil intention.
2. If, for instance, a dog rushed out suddenly and frightened the horse, it would be accidental death.
3. Hunger and thirst are ἀναικαί, love or anger are φυσικά. Acts done under these constraints are not excusable on the ground that there was no previous intention. This is the principle modern law recognises in cases of drunkenness.
4. Since προβολευμα is wanted for the complete guilt of the act.
Rightly therefore acts done in anger are judged not to be done with intent; for it is not the doer of the act through passion that is the real originator of it, but the person who put him in a rage. Further, the question in this case is not raised about the thing that vexed him having been really done, or not: for the rage is felt on the strength of an apparent wrong. Men do not here, as in business transactions, dispute about a question of fact (where one party or the other must be unprincipled, unless indeed they do the wrong through forgetfulness). In this case they admit the act, but only raise the question, on which side the justice lies. Now one who makes a premeditated attack, cannot plead ignorance; so that (on this ground) the one thinks he suffers a wrong, the other denies it. And there is no doubt

1. If a man thrashes another in a rage, because he thinks he abused or insulted him, the act is not made more or less guilty because the abuse or insult was true or false. It is the doing the act under the impulse of passion resulting from a supposed wrong, that alone is to be considered.

2. As a man may bona fide forget to discharge a debt. A says to B, “you owe me a pound.” B denies it. He is as dishonest as A would be as a wrongful claimant, unless B really forgets that he had not paid.

3. As, “I fully thought you meant to insult me, and therefore I was justified in horse-whipping you.” The party aggrieved, of course, says that justice is on his side, and that the aggressor must be punished.

4. Pleading the provocatio. The argument again is, that where there is knowledge, there is guilt. Jelf says: “The act of aggression is admitted, and ignorance is.
that, if he does the injury with a deliberate wish, he is guilty of wrong. And it is only when he does wrong after this kind of wrong-doing1 that he becomes a wrong-doer, whenever his act is in violation of proportion or contrary to what is fair. It is the same with the just man; (he is just only)² when he does just acts with full intention; but he does a just act if only he does it voluntarily.³ Now of involuntary actions some are excusable, others not so. For such errors as men commit, not only in ignorance but also through ignorance, we make allowance for; while for misdeeds done not through ignorance, but in ignorance indeed, yet through some state or condition that is neither natural nor human,⁴ no allowance can be made.

pleaded: the question is, was it done with a deliberate intent to be unjust, so as to justify the anger of the other party?" Sir A. Grant makes ὃ μὲν refer to ἐπισευλεύσας, "the aggressor pleads that he was injured before, which plea the one who has suffered from his violence denies," Mr. Richards (Journal of Philology, No. 7, p. 154), gives this explanation: "When a man has plotted against another, he cannot remain in rance of what he has done the other’s complaints of injustice unfounded, but having injured him deliberately, he acted unjustly and knows it."

1. Viz. ἐκ προαιρέσεως.
2. He is ἠθικὸς.
3. He is δικαιός if he does it ἐκὼν, but ἠθικὸς if he does it ἐκ προαιρέσεως. Mr. Williams seems to me to miss the sense here; "and he alone properly pursues just dealing who thus acts of his own free will."
4. But bestial or degrading, such as drunkenness may be considered.

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XI. ἀπορήσεως δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἴκανῶς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικείν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστων ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἰπήκε, λέγων ἄτόπως

ματέρα κατέκτα τὴν ἔμην, βραχῶς λόγος,
ἐκών ἐκούσαν, ἢ θέλουσαν οὐχ ἐκών

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστων ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ
5 ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἄταν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον.
Καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκέλος, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον. Ὁμολώς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαίους τὸ γὰρ δικαίοπραγεῖν πᾶν

XI. Now one might raise a difficulty, (assuming the definition to have been properly given about suffering and doing injustice) in the first place, whether this is possible in the sense in which Euripides has stated it, speaking paradoxically,

He slew my mother,—brief the tale to tell,—
Both being willing, or unwilling both.¹

For the doubt is, whether it is possible for a man really to be wronged with his own consent, or not possible, but the act must always be done to him against his will, just as the doing a wrong must always be intentional; and again, whether the being wronged is wholly this way or that,² (as the doing wrong is entirely a voluntary act,) or one kind of it is voluntary and another kind involuntary. And similarly in the case of being justly dealt with: for all just dealing is voluntary, so that it is reasonable there

1. κατέκταν for κατέκτα, and οὐ θέλουσαν for θέλουσαν, have been proposed as corrections; but, apart from the context, we cannot be sure if the vulgate is wrong.
2. ¹ c. always to be "all ruled one way," seems the meaning.
3. As in the case of ἐαντὸν ἀδικεῖν. We cannot conceive ἀδικεῖν, in the true sense, without intention to act unfairly: but ἀδικεῖσθαι is conceivable when the party is so far willing to be wronged, that he knowingly, or by his own fault, allows himself to be so.


should be set opposite to both cases, (i. e. both the being wrongly and the being fairly treated,) the being so willingly or unwillingly.¹ But it would seem a strange thing, in the case of being justly dealt with likewise, if it is wholly with one’s consent; for some persons are justly dealt with without their consent.²

5 (The above questions acquire our consideration:) for a person might raise a difficulty on this point also,—whether one who has suffered a wrong is in every instance unjustly treated, or whether, as in acting, so it is in suffering; for incidentally it is possible in both to have something of justice done to you.³ Of course, it is the same also in transactions generally dishonest; since doing unjust acts is not identical with being unjust, nor suffering injustice with being unfairly done to, there may be ἀτόχημα rather than ἀδικία. Nay, a man may even do a wrong to another when he intended to do him a service. By ἐπ’ ἀμφότερον he means, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πάσχειν. Mr. Williams; “in the case of just dealing, both agent and patient may be concerned with what is just incidentally.”

1. If ἀδικεῖν is πᾶν ἐκώσιον, and δικαιοφραγεῖν also πᾶν ἐκώσιον, and if further ἐστιν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐκώσιον, ἄκωσιον, then it is εὐλογον that the same should hold of δικαιοφραγεῖν, i. e.

2. When a man is rightly punished for a crime.

3. Both in doing and in being

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μικείσθαι. Ὄροιος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγείν καὶ δικαίωσθαι, ἀδύνατον γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μη καὶ δικαίωσθαι μη δικαιοπραγείν. Εἰ δὲ έστιν ἀπλῶς τὸ δικαίως, τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα τιμά, τὸ δὲ ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῷ ἄκρατης ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτὸν, εἰκὼν τ' ἂν δικαίωτα καὶ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν δικεῖν. "Εστὶ δὲ καὶ τούτῳ ἐν τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν δικεῖν. "Ετι ἐκὼν ἂν τις δὲ ἄκρασιν ὑπ' ἂλλου βλάπτοι καὶ ἐκόντος, ὅστ' εἴη ἂν εκόντι δικεῖσθαι. 12 Ἡ οὖν ὅρθος ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τοῖς βλάπτειν dealt with. All this is equally true also in the case of doing honest acts and being honestly treated; for it is impossible to be wronged unless there is some one to do the wrong, or to be justly treated unless there is a doer of a just deed. 1 And if doing an injustice is simply the knowingly hurting some one,—and knowingly means, when one is fully aware of the whom, and the wherewith, and the how; and if the intemperate man knowingly and deliberately does harm to himself,—then he would be knowingly wronged, and it would be possible for a man to wrong himself. 2 And this is one of the points on which people differ, whether a man can be said to wrong himself. Further: it is conceivable that a man through intemperance may be knowingly wronged by to another 3 with intention on his part; so that it is thus possible for a man to be wronged with his own consent. Or shall

1. An agent and a patient are implied alike in both. By ὅμως he means, that as in the case of αὐτίκα just above, it is here also καί ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν. Unless a right or a wrong is with the doer, it cannot be said to exist in the sufferer.

2. Two disputed points are here affirmed; δι' ἐστιν ἔκοντα αὐτίκασθαι, and δι' ἐστιν ἄντων ἄδικεῖν ἑαυτῶν.

3. ὑπ' ἄλλου, as in the former case ὑπ' αὐτῶν. In the case here supposed, there is ἄντων both in the πάσχειν and the πάρετα, as when a man deliberately gets drunk and is pelted by the mob, and so gets hurt. If he was merely hit accidentally by a stone, he could not be said ἄδικεῖσθαι by the thrower of it.

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we say this definition is not correct, but that we must add to the ‘doing harm with a knowledge of the whom and the wherewith and the how,’ the doing it ‘against the wish of the sufferer.’ According to this then, a man is injured knowingly, and suffers a wrong, but no man is wronged knowingly and with his own consent. For no man wishes to be wronged, not even the intemperate; but he is acting in a way contrary to his own wish: for no man wishes what he thinks is not good, and the intemperate man is not doing what he thinks he ought to do.

But a man who gives away what is his own, as Homer says that Glauce gave Diomedes

"Golden for bronze, a hundred beoves to nine,"
is not wronged; for the giving depends on himself, whereas it is not good for him, is against his own wish; for no man boyledaia kaká. Admitting therefore the addition of para boulyshon, it is still possible for a man ekounta adikeisti,.

1. If to constitute adikia there must be the para boulyshon. But no man actually wishes to be wronged, though he may consent to it and deliberately get himself hurt, as by any act of intemperance.

2. The akrafitis is justly said adikei tin, because adikei para tin boulyshon in that he does that knowingly which, since he is aware

3. This is not, like the other, a case of ekounta adikeisti, for the boulyshon, not the para boulyshon, was a condition of it.
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τὰ δικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔπει αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄδικοντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἄδικεῖσθαι, ὡς οὖν ἐκούσιον, δῆλον. XII. ἔτι οὖν προειλομένα δύν ἢ στὶν εἴπεῖν, πῶς τοῦτο ἄδικεῖ οحرم κοινοὺς παρὰ τὴν ἄξιων τὸ πλέον ή ὁ ἔχων, καὶ ἢ ἢ ἢ στὶν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἄδικεῖν ἢ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρῶτον λεξίθεν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἄδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὖχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἴ τις πλέον ἑτέρον ἢ αὐτῷ νόμιμο εἰδῶς καὶ ἑκὼν, οὗτος αὐτός αὐτὸν ἄδικεῖ. "Οπερ δικοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικὸς ἢ στὶν.

10 Ἡ ὡθεῖ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἑτέρον γὰρ ἀλγαθοῦ, εἴ ἢ ἢ τε, ἡπειρόντεκτε, οἴνον δόξης ἤ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. "Ετι λύεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἄδικεῖν οὖθεν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν

the being wronged is not in oneself, but there must be some one to do the wrong to us. With respect then to the being wronged, it is clear that it can never be with a man's own consent.

XII. But there are yet two more points of those we selected for discussion. These are (1) whether the umpire who makes too large an award beyond the merit of the recipient, is guilty of wrong, or he who accepts it; (2) Can a man wrong himself? For if the former case (in 1) is possible,—that is, if he who awards and not he who takes too much is in the wrong,—then if a person knowingly and willingly assigns to another more than to himself, (as in 2), that man wrongs himself. And this is just what in fact moderate and reasonable people do: for your reasonable man is inclined to take less than his just claim. (Or must we say that not even this is a plain statement of the case? For it may be that in taking less he got a larger share in another kind of good, as of credit,1 or of some general and

1. As a landlord, in letting his λόγος καλὸν is meant that which is land at any easy rate, may gain much always and unconditionally good in respect of popularity. By τὸ ἀπ- all alike.

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abstract good.) The question is also answered by our definition of doing wrong; for the man who gives too much suffers nothing against his own will, so that he is not wronged on that account, but, at the worst, he only suffers a loss. It is clear too that (in case 1) it is the maker of the award who does wrong, and not in every case the taker of more than his share. For it is not he that does wrong, who does that which involves the abstract principle of injustice, but he who is charged with doing it on purpose. And this intention lies with the party with whom the act originates; which (in case 1) is in him who makes the award, and not in him who receives the share.

Further; since doing has several senses, and there are cases in which lifeless things kill, and the hand of another, or his slave at his bidding; the actual doer in such circumstances does not act wrongly, albeit he does what constitutes a wrong. And still further: if the award was made in igno-

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1. That ἐκόψαν must attach to ἀδικεῖν, and ἐκόψαν and παρὰ βούλησιν ἀδικεῖσθαι.

2. A man who gives short change for a sovereign by mistake, does that ὑπάρχει, but he is not said ἀδικεῖν, since he did not intend to cheat. So there is ἀδίκον both in the διανέμων πλέον and the λαμβάνων πλέον, both being unfair; but the motive and the intention are wholly on the side of the διανέμων, who therefore alone ἀδικεῖ.

3. i. e. when constrained by another.

4. To my mind, the subject to ἀδικεῖ is ἐμφυσχα, ἡ χείρ, ὁ οἰκετής. Mr. Williams makes it ὁ λαμβάνων πλέον.
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οὐκ ἄδικα ἐκ τὸ νομικῶν δίκαιων οὐδ’ ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἔστιν, ἐστὶ δ’ ὅς ἄδικος: ἔτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιων καὶ τὸ πρῶτον εἴ δὲ γνώσκον ἔκρινεν ἄδικος, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡ χάριτος ἡ τιμορίας. ὡσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ

5 τις μερίσασθαι τοῦ ἄδικώτατος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταύτα κρίνας ἄδικος πλέον ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνον ὁ τὸν ἁγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἁγρὸν ἀλλ’ ἁργὺριον ἔλαβεν.

XIII. Οἱ δ’ ἄνθρωποι ἐφ’ ἐαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ

rancce, the maker of it is not guilty of wrong, as justice is laid down by the law, nor is his award an unjust one. And yet it is in a sense unjust; for legal justice and original or natural justice are not the same thing. But if with full knowledge he decided unjustly, then he too (as well as the recipient) makes an unfair gain in the favour he does to one side or the spiting the other side. Hence, not less than if one were directly to share in the profits of a wrong, the person who from the above motives gave an unjust decision has his advantage in doing so; for in that case the person who adjudged the field in dispute received, not (a share of) the field directly, but money:

XIII. Men fancy that because doing a wrong is in

1. The law acquits such a man on the ground of mistake; but still the injustice has been done, and we cannot say it is not injustice. Suppose, for example, an examiner through incompetence were to reject a candidate who deserved to pass, or by accident were to give him too high a total of marks; there would hardly be blame, but undoubted injustice would be done.

2. And if πλεονεκτεῖ, therefore ἄδικα.

3. The words καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνων are difficult. They do not seem antithetical, as is usual, with διὰ ταύτα, which must mean διὰ χάριν or τιμωρίαν, but they appear to mean ‘the other case,’ viz. of indirect profit through χάρις, &c., as distinct from the direct profit of μερίσασθαι ἄδικήματος,—the ἁργὺριον being the bribe received for the award. Mr. Williams’ version is this: “In the case, for instance, of receiving a share in the profits of a wrong, he who unjustly awarded the field which was in dispute, may have received, not a portion of the field itself, but the equivalent in money of such a portion,” Mr. Chase, “because in this case the man who wrongly adjudged, say a field, did not actually get land but money by his unjust decision.”

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their own power, therefore to be just is easy. But it is not so: to lie with one's neighbour's wife, and to strike some one near, and the giving with the hand the bribe (for a partial award), are easy acts, and in men's own power; but to do these things with the particular disposition is neither easy nor in their power. 1 On a similar principle they consider that to know right and wrong is nothing clever, because what the laws speak about it cannot be hard to understand. But this is not justice, except incidentally: it is when actions are done or awards are made in a certain way that they become just; and this is a matter of more trouble than to know what are the conditions of health. 10 For in this case also it is easy to have some knowledge about honey, wine, and hellebore, of cautery and the use of the knife; but how they should be applied for restoring health, to whom and when, is no less a matter than to be a physician. And for this same reason 2 they think that

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1. This seems a subtle distinction, and is probably only introduced as an antithesis to the more obvious truth, that it is easy to do, mechanically as it were, a right action without any high motives.

2. Viz. the supposed facility.
wrong-doing is no less in the power of the just man (than right-doing); inasmuch as the just man may be able to do each of those acts not less, but perhaps even more (than the unjust). For he may be able to lie with his neighbour’s wife, and give a blow; and so the brave man might throw down his shield, and turn in this or that direction and run.

The answer is, that to play the coward and to commit an injustice is not merely to do these things, except incidentally, but to do them with a certain disposition; just as the treatment of patients and the keeping oneself well is not the use or the non-use of the knife or of drugs, but the same under certain circumstances. In fact, just acts only have place among those who have a share in things intrinsically good, and are capable of having too much or too little of them,—for to some there can be no excess in what is good,

1. The δίκαιος may chance to have more opportunities, more physical strength &c. than the δικείν.
2. Aristotle will not concede that ἄπτο τῆς ἐρασίας πράττεται τὰ ἐρασία, sup. ch. 1. The πραγμάτωσι or moral intention to do wrong is wanting in the δίκαιος, though he does the act mechanically, as it were.
3. A man is not necessarly a coward because he runs away in war. He may be even brave, and consider self-preservation his duty; or he may be forced along in the general panic.
4. For πλεονεκτεύειν is ἀδικεῖν, but a man is only said πλεονεκτεύειν χρημάτων, &c. but not πλεονεκτεύειν ἀρετής, since he can hardly be too virtuous. Where the stock of goods is...
toûtois kai ἐλλειψιν’ toûs méν γὰρ οὖκ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ
aîtôn, oîn èσωs toûs theôs, toûs ὀ ὀοθὲν μόριον ὠφελι-
μου, toûs ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει, toûs ὑὲ
μέχρι τοῦ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἀνθρώπινου ἔστιν.

5 XIV. Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, τῶς
ἐχεὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖα πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς
tὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενον ἐστὶν εὑστείν οὐτὲ γὰρ ὡς ταῦταν
ἀπλῶς οὐθ’ ὡς ἑτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοποσὲνοις,
καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἀνδρὰ τὸν τοι-
10 οὖτον, ὅστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν

as perhaps to the gods, while conversely to others no par-
ticle of good is useful at all,¹ that is, to the incurably bad,
but every thing good is simply injurious; and to a third
party, it is useful only up to a certain point. And thus it
appears that ‘the just’ is a kind of dealing only known to
man.²

5 XIV. Connected with the foregoing is the discussion about
equity and the equitable,—what relation εὐκατ’ has to jus-
tice, and the equitable to the just. For it appears on con-
sideration that the one is neither absolutely the same as
the other, nor yet different from it in kind. At one time we
praise equity, and the man who is equitable in his dealings;
10 so that we transfer this characteristic, in our praise of it, to
some other of the good qualities³ beside mere good; thereby

limited, some one must be wronged,
but not where it is unlimited, or
where there is no good at all to be
got.

1. i.e. there are some to whom
an ἐλλειψις ἄγαθοι, or having too
little good, is inconceivable, seeing
that they are wholly and absolutely
bad, and would not care for good
even if they could get it.

2. Since to the gods there can
no ὑπερβολὴ or ἐλλειψις ἄγαθοι.

Aristotle does not say here δίκαιο-
σύνη, the principle of justice, but
δίκαιον, ‘the just’ in its application,
or relation to another. To say that
the gods have τὸ δίκαιον would be to
say that, without it, they would
cheat each other. And where good
is in infinite abundance, there is no
scope for fraud.

3. ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα is rather obscure.
Perhaps, ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Mr. Williams
renders it, ‘we transfer the name,
showing that the more equitable an act is, the better it is. But at another time it seems strange to those who follow reason that the equitable, if it is something else than, and beside the just, should be praise-worthy at all. For either the just is not good,\(^1\) or the equitable is not the just,\(^2\) if it is something else; or, if both are good, then they are the same. It is from some such considerations as these that the difficulty about equity arises. And yet all that has been said about it is true in a way, and involves no contradiction in itself.\(^3\) For equity, while belonging to the just of a particular sort, is a superior kind of 'the just,'\(^4\) and is not, as being a different thing in kind, better than the just. Hence 'just' and 'equitable' are virtually the same; and while both are good, the equitable is the better. The

\(^1\) i.e. if equity, as distinct from it, is good, στονδαίων or ἐπαγωγὸν.

\(^2\) Which would be a paradox. The sense seems sufficiently good without alteration. Mr. Williams translates, "if, on the one hand, the just be distinct from the equitable, then it must follow that either justice is not good, or else equity is not good;" and in a note he says, "Read ἡ τὸ ἐπικεκές τὸ δίκαιον εἴ τὸ ἄλλο." I do not think this is right.

\(^3\) The construction seems to be, ἀπαρταὶ τὸ περὶ τοῦ ἐπικεκές εἰρήμινα ἔχει ὁσιών, καὶ (ἔχει) οὔδεν ὑπεναντίων ἐκατονί.

\(^4\) If superior to it, it is so as being a kindred kind of it, not as distinct from it.
difficulty is caused by the fact, that though the equitable is the just, it is not the just as laid down by the law.\(^1\) Rather, it is a correction of the legally just. And the reason why it requires correction is, that all law is general, but there are some points on which it is not possible to speak rightly in a general way.\(^2\) In cases therefore in which it is necessary to speak generally, but not possible to speak with absolute correctness, the law takes a general result,\(^3\) though fully aware in what respect it fails. And it is not the less right\(^4\) on this account; for the fault is not in the law nor in the legislator, but in the very nature of the subject dealt with; since, at the very outset, such is the matter of all human action.\(^5\) Whenever therefore the law speaks generally, and there happens in some particular case to be an exception to the general rule, then it becomes right, where

1. But if νόμομον is δίκαιον, that which corrects or amends law would seem to make νόμομον not really δίκαιον.

2. There are special cases, the precise merits of which no general law can reach. A general law may be, as is often said, "very hard on some people," because not really equitable.

3. i.e. is contented with a general application.

4. With ὅρθως we may supply ἔχων or λέγων.

5. Ἡμ. that it cannot be exactly met in all cases by particular laws.
the legislator has made some omission and fallen into a mistake by speaking generally, to set right the deficiency, (by deciding) as the author of the law himself would decide, were he present at the time, and as in fact he would have framed his law, if he had been aware of the case. For this reason equity is a sort of justice, and better than a certain kind of it,—not than the absolutely and generally just, but than the error made through its being only general justice. And this is the true nature of the equitable,—it is ‘a setting right of law where it fails through being general.’ And this in fact is the reason of another anomaly,—that not all things fall under the letter of the law, because there are some matters about which it is impossible to pass a law, so that a special enactment is required to meet them. For the measure of what is not fixed or defined must itself be indeterminate; like the leaden temple used in Lesbian architecture: for the mea-

1. Perhaps the flutings of the Ionic columns are meant, which vary a little with the tapering upwards. What we call a “leaden tape” can hardly be the same thing. Mr. Williams translates, ‘that which is in itself irregular requires an irregular rule, exactly as the Lesbian walls of uneven masonry require a leaden rule by which to measure their actual length.’ I cannot persuade myself that this is right. Sir A. Grant also refers it to the irregular polygonal blocks of Cyclopian masonry; but Λεσβιαν κώμα which he cites from Æsch. Fragm. 70, must be something different.
κανῶν. πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ
οὐ μένει ὁ κανῶν, καὶ τὸ ψῆφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸν βέλτιον
dικαίον, ἤδηλον. Φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπι
εικός τὸ ἐστὶν ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικός καὶ
πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδικαῖος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ’
ἐλαττωτικός, καὶ τερ ἐκων τῶν νόμων βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής
ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἐξίς αὐτὴ ἐπιεικεία, δικαιοσύνη τῶν οὐσών καὶ
οὐχ ἐτέρα τις ἐξίς.

10 XV. Πότερον δ’ εὐνεχεῖται ἑαυτὸν ἄθικεῖν ἢ οὐ,
φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν δίκαιων

sure keeps changing according to the shape of the stone,
and does not remain constant; and in the same way the
special enactment accommodates itself to special circum-
stances.

Thus, then, what ‘the equitable’ is, and that it is a
‘just,’ and to what kind of ‘just’ it is superior, is clear.
And from this it is also clear who the equitable man is; it
is he who has a moral preference for, and an ability to
carry out actions of this nature; he who does not rigidly
insist on his dues on the wrong side, but is willing to
take something less, though he has the law on his side.
And this temper is equity, in itself a kind of justice, and
not a different habit of mind.

10 XV. Whether it is possible or not possible for a man
to wrong himself, is clear from what has already been said. For
some kinds of just acts are such as are enjoined by

1. Vis. the τὸ καθόλου or ‘gene-
neral.’
2. On the side of πλεονεξία.
Mr. Williams’ version is hardly cor-
rect, “who does not wrest the letter
of the law to his neighbour’s wrong.”
3. The common meanings of ἐπιεικὴς, ‘reasonable,’ ‘respectable,’
‘humane,’ ‘moderate,’ turn on the
notion of ‘fair dealing.’
4. This chapter contains no re-
ference to the question of equity, but
reverts to chap. xii. It seems proba-
ble that it is here out of its proper
place.
the law in conformity with general virtue. For instance, the law does not order a man to kill himself; and what it does not order, it virtually forbids. And when a man does an injury contrary to law, (otherwise than in retaliation,\(^1\)) knowingly, that is, with a knowledge of the whom and the where-with, he is guilty of wrong. Now he who in anger cuts his own throat does so deliberately, contrary to right reason, which the law does not allow him to do, and therefore he is guilty of a wrong. But to whom does he do the wrong? Is it not the state, rather than himself? It seems so; for he suffers the injury knowingly, and no man is wronged with his own consent. And therefore the state imposes a penalty, and a kind of civil disability\(^3\) attaches to one who has destroyed himself, as to one guilty of wrong against the state.

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1. The law orders all things that are generally right, and therefore it forbids all acts that come under any other head than that of right. Thus the suicide is guilty of ἀνάλημα because he is παράνοιος. He is ἀδικός to the state, even if not to himself, (since some deny that a man can be said ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν).

2. The question of returning an injury, which gives a kind of justification to wrong-doing, cannot, of course, be entertained in the case of suicide. The condition of ἐκοῦσον too attaches more plainly to wrongs done without provocation. The argument is to show, that a suicide is ἀδικός, though some would deny this, because a man cannot be said ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν or ἀδικεῖται ἑαυτῷ.

3. Via the refusal of ἀνάλημα.
But further; in so far as a man is a wrong-doer who merely commits some particular wrong, and is not altogether bad, even in this respect he cannot be said to wrong himself.\footnote{A man cannot be truly said to wrong himself even when he commits an ἀδικία, but this even a chance or casual wrongdoing of oneself is not more possible than deliberate and habitual wrongdoing.} For this case is different from that other. The wrong-doer in this way is, in a sense, bad, as the coward is bad, that is,\footnote{Perhaps, άλλοι άλλοι άλλοι άλλοι.} as not being completely vitious; so that not even according to this (limited) form of vice is he guilty of a wrong,\footnote{Mr. Williams translates, “But yet, even in this sense, he does not wrong himself.” I think Aristotle means by κατά ταύτην, τινι μόνον ἀδικούντος, i. e. τινι εν μέρει, πλαν.} for if he were, it would be possible for the same 5 man to have the same thing taken from him and added to him; but that is impossible; the just and the unjust must of necessity involve a plurality.\footnote{There must be at least one ποιήν and one παράχων.}

But yet another condition attaches to a wrong,—besides the intention and the deliberate wish, it must also be done first.\footnote{It must be aggressive; the ὑπάρχειν ἀδικώς, was, to the Greek, a special condition of wrong-doing,—the ulto of the Romans.} For he who retaliates with the same treatment because he has been a sufferer, is not considered to do a wrong: but if a man could retaliate on himself, he would be at once the sufferer and the doer.
Still further: if a man could wrong himself, it would be possible for him to be wronged with his own consent. And besides all these considerations, no man does wrong without the commission of some particular injustice; but no man commits adultery with his own wife, nor a burglary in his own house, nor a theft on his own property. But generally the dispute whether a man can ‘wrong himself’ is solved by the definition given of being voluntarily wronged.

Now it is clear that though both are bad, *viz.* the suffering wrong and the doing it, (for the one is in effect the having less, the other having more than the mean; and the mean in justice is what is healthy in the craft of medicine, and of good bodily condition in training,) yet the doing *to* wrong is the worse. For the doing wrong implies vitiousness, and so is held in disrepute; and the vitiousness in question is either complete and absolute, or nearly so; (I say *nearly*, for not all voluntary wrong is associated with injus-

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1. He must do some *άδικα* to somebody to be *άδικος* at all.
2. *i.e.* quite apart from the above minor considerations.

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ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK V.


d
dikias), to δ' a dikexibh ai aevn kaikias kai dikias. Ka'to aut' me'n ouv to dikexibh aitton faivon, kata sumbebhkos δ' ouvthen kolvne me'izon einai kaikon. 'Allo ouvthen meliei ti techne, all' pleu'ritiv legei me'izov voson 5 prospataismatos kal'toi genou' ai nute bateron kata sumbebhkos, ei prospataisanta dia to pesein symba'ly u'to ton polemion lphthnai kai apothanein. Kata metafora'n de kai omoioph'ata estin ouv aut' p'ros auton dikaiow all' ton auton tisw, ou pav de dikaiow all' to 10 de'spottikon o to oikonomikon en to'tous gar tois logous di' obsthe te ton logon e'chon meros the'psi xhpis p'ros to allogon.

tice'

1. In the case of ∄eitpovin, for instance.
2. That a broken shin is worse.
3. Or perhaps, 'is caught through falling.'
4. This return to the question of dikexin evantov is perhaps out of place. It is argued that reason has a right to control unreasonable impulses, just as a master has a right to control a slave. These two parts of a man are as ἀρχων and ἀρχόμενος, or de'spottis and doilos, and therefore he claims, or his reason claims, a de'spottikon dikaiow over his passions, and he cannot say this coer- cion is being 'unjust to himself.'
Εἰς ἄ δὴ θείτοις καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἁδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τῶς ἐαυτῶν ὑνεξεῖς· ὲσπερ οὖν ἀρχοντε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δικαίως ἵνα καὶ τούτοις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἕθεικῶν ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τοῦ τρόπου τούτου.

that is irrational. To those who look to this distinction\(^{1}\) it appears that there is such a thing as injustice towards oneself for this reason also, because in these parts\(^{2}\) it is possible for a man to suffer something contrary to his own appetites; and so they consider that, as in the case of ruler and subject, there is a mutual relation of justice also between these parts of the soul.\(^{3}\)

5 With respect then to Justice and the other moral virtues let the definitions given as above suffice.

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Or, 'to those parts then (of the soul) men look, and it seems to them that' &c.
\item 2. Or, since a man is in possession of these parts, the irrational and the rational.
\item 3. The unreasoning part is bound to obey λόγος or reason, and reason itself must not be too hard a master, and refuse all, even reasonable, indulgence.
\end{itemize}
I. META δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἠδονής ἦσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν μᾶλλον γὰρ δοκεῖ συνοφορεῖσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰκεῖοντες ἡδονῆ καὶ λύπη. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡθοῦν ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μυσεῖν ἀ δεῖ διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπῆν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐθαίρετον βίον τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἴδεα προαροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. Ἡπέρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἡμιστ ἤν δόξει σκέπτεον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ

I. Next in order, perhaps, follows a discussion about pleasure, since it seems in an especial manner to be familiar and natural to our race,—which is the reason why they train the young by the guiding principle of pleasure and pain.¹ It seems too to be a most important point in the moral character that we should like what we ought, and dislike what we ought. For these are influences that extend through the whole life,² and have weight and power for virtue and for a happy life, inasmuch as men naturally prefer what is pleasant and shun what is painful to them.

On subjects then of this kind it would seem to be least of all proper to drop further discussion, especially as they

¹. Like the two rudder-paddles of a trireme, pain and pleasure, or punishment and reward, draw away from and towards things to be avoided or pursued.
². Not merely during the time of education.
involve considerable uncertainty. For some say that the chief good consists in pleasure, while others on the contrary denounce it as altogether bad; the one party perhaps from a conviction that it really is so; the other, from an opinion that it is better, for regulating our life, to class pleasure among bad things, even it really be not such. For they hold that, as most persons incline towards it, and become slaves to their pleasures, we ought to lead them backwards to the contrary, on the chance of their thus coming to the mean.\textsuperscript{1} Perhaps however this is not well said; for theories in matters concerning the feelings and the conduct are less convincing than facts; and so whenever they are at variance with what we see and hear of human actions, they are despised, at the same time bring the truth into discredit. For he who disparages pleasure, if he has been seen on any occasion to pursue it,\textsuperscript{2} is thought to fall away towards it, as if

\textsuperscript{1} If they are taught to bear what is disagreeable, more than is really necessary, their natural fondness for pleasure is sure to draw them some way in that direction.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{i.e.}, even on a legitimate occasion and in a legitimate degree.
pleasure were all bad; for the majority are unable to define. It seems then only such statements as are true are useful, and that they are especially so not only for knowledge but for practical life; for they are in harmony with facts, and so are believed; and hence they induce those who comprehend

their truth to live in accordance with them. Enough however of these introductory remarks; let us proceed to discuss the opinions advanced about pleasure.

II. Eudoxus then considered pleasure to be the chief good, from seeing all creatures, both rational and irrational, hankering after it. In the case of all, he argued, what is choice-worthy must be what is suited to them; and what is most so, is the best. And so the fact that all creatures are impelled towards the same end, proves that it is the best for all. For each tries to find what is good for itself, as in the case of food; that therefore which is good for all, and

1. Mr. Williams renders it, "as being, on the whole, choice-worthy." Either way gives a meaning; but I think Aristotle intended to say, that if on a single occasion a person gives himself an indulgence, when he is known as an opponent of pleasure generally, he is regarded as a backslider from his own code of virtue, whereas the particular pleasure may be rightly and consistently enjoyed under the circumstances.
at which all aim, must be the good. (Thus Eudoxus); and his words were commonly accepted rather through his good character than for their own sake; for he was considered to be a very temperate man, and therefore not to make these statements as a friend of pleasure, but because they really were true.1

5 He also thought that his position was equally plain from the law of contraries, viz. that as pain per se was to be shunned by all creatures, so that which is opposed to it must be a matter of choice. Again, that which was most choice-worthy which we choose not on account of or for the sake of some other thing; and that pleasure was confessedly 10 of this nature,2 since no one puts the useless question, why ‘is he pleased,’ for he assumes that pleasure is choice-worthy on its own account.

Further, he argued that pleasure, when added to any other good, made it more deserving of our choice; for

1. In this sentence ἔδοκει is used both personally and impersonally. The translators wrongly make οὕτως ἔχειν depend on the personal sense, “he was convinced” &c.
2. There was no τέλος to which pleasure was but a means.
instance, to acts of honesty and self-control; and that, of course, good can only be enhanced by itself.1

But2 this last argument, at all events, only seems to prove that pleasure is one of several kinds of good, and not that it is at all more so than another. For anything is more choice-worthy combined with some other good, than when taken alone. And in fact, it is by a similar argument that Plato3 demolishes (the claims of pleasure, and shows) that it is not the good. For he says4 that the life of pleasure is more choice-worthy when combined with intellectuality than without it. Now, if the combined is better, the simple, i.e. pleasure, is not the good: for by no addition to it can that which is in itself the good become more deserving of our choice.5 And it is clear that neither can anything else be the chief good, which in combination with some other of the things that are in themselves good6

1. By something of the same nature as itself; since no one would say that ἀγαθὸς became greater by the addition of κακὸν, or that white-wash was made whiter by a mixture of soot.
2. I should read ἐνεχὲς δὲ for ἐνεχὲ

            δὴ and just below τοιούτῳ δὲ λόγῳ for δὴ &c.
3. καὶ Πλάτων, ib. As Eudoxus proves, so also Plato disproves, by one and the same argument.
4. e.g. in the Philbus, passim.
5. “For it is a criterion of the chief good, that it cannot possibly be made better by any addition.” Williams. In the next sentence, he wrongly, as I think, takes τἀγαθών for the subject, whereas it is rather the predicate, as Mr. Chase also renders it.
6. This should rather be τῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν. Perhaps τῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ means ‘goods of the same kind as itself.’
book x.] aristotle's ethics. [chap. ii.

καθ' αυτό ναγαδόν αἵρετότερον γίνεται. τι οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὐ καὶ ἥμεις κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπικρατεῖται. οἱ δ' ενυπατόμενοι άς οὐκ ἁγαθοῦν οὐ πάντες ἐφίεται, μὴ οὖθεν λέγωσιν τὸ γὰρ πάσι δοκεῖ, τούτ' εἶναι φαμέν. 'ο δ' ἀναιρὼν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάντων τις τιστότερα ἐρεῖ: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἄνωτα ἀφέγγειτο αὐτῶν, ἢν ἄν τι τὸ λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγομεν ἄν τί; ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικῶν ἁγαθῶν κρείττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, δ' ἐφίεται τῷ οἴκελον ἁγαθοῦν. οὐκ έσοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ φασίν, εἰ ἢ λύπη κακῶν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἁγαθοῦν εἶναι ἀντικείσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακῶν κακῷ

becomes more choice-worthy. What good then is there of this kind, which even we of the human race can take part in?¹ For it is a good of this kind that is the object of our search.

Now those who object (to Eudoxus) that what all creatures hanker after is not (of necessity) good for them, appear to say² nothing to the purpose. For what all think, we speak of as fact; and he who does away with this ground of belief, will hardly tell what we can better believe in. For if only irrational creatures had an appetite for them,³ there would have been something in what was said; but, as also the intelligent desire them, how can the objection have any weight? Perhaps too even in the lower animals there is a kind of natural good,⁴ superior to their own nature, and aiming at what is peculiarly good for them.

Nor does the argument about the contrary seem to be well urged.⁵ It does not follow, they say, because pain is an

1. Not ideal or transcendentall good, but practical. By τοιοῦτον is meant something which shall be the good without requiring any addition to make it so.
2. Supply σκεπτέων with μη.
3. i.e. τῶν σφισιν ἁγαθῶν.
4. Even animals are in a sense φρόνιμα, and not wholly ἄλογα, in as-much as they have an instinct for what is good for them.
5. Vit in reply to Eudoxus.
evil, that pleasure is a good; for the opposite to evil may be (not a good, but) some other evil,\(^1\) and both evil and good may stand opposed to something which is neither one nor the other.\(^2\) And this is not badly said, only it is not truth-telling in the particular matters spoken of.\(^3\) For if both (pleasure and pain) were bad, both ought equally to be avoided; if neither, then neither, or, at least, in the same degree. As it is, however, men do plainly avoid pain as an evil, and choose pleasure as a good; thus then they are really opposed to each other.\(^4\)

Nor does it at all the more follow, that because pleasure is not one of the qualities, it therefore is not a good.\(^5\) The active exercise of virtue cannot be reckoned

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1. *e.g.* cowardice to reckless daring, meanness to profligate waste &c.
2. The contrast to drunkenness may be "teetotalism," or to conspicuous bravery, the quiet residence at home &c.
4. Lit. "pleasure is opposed to pain." The argument here is not very clear. Mr. Williams renders it, "if pleasure and pain were neither evil nor yet good, then ought each to have been neither pursued nor avoided." This is rather forcing the Greek. I think Aristotle means, "if neither pleasure nor pain were bad, there would be no reason for shunning either, or, at least, one more than the other. But men do shun pain and seek pleasure; and that is a reason for believing one to be a good and the other an evil, in direct opposition to each other."
5. As we speak of the "good qualities of a man," virtue, temperance &c. These are distinguished from *sordidissimum," "faculties," as medicine, oratory &c., from *érōs, "habits," and from states or conditions, among which pleasure and happiness are classed.
BOOK X.

ARISTOTLES ETHICS. [CHAP. II.

among qualities, nor can happiness. They say too that the
good is limited, but pleasure is unlimited, in that it admits
(indefinitely) of more or less. Well, then, if they judge of
this from the feeling of pleasure, the same will hold about
justice and the other virtues, in which we do plainly say that
men are more or less so-and-so; for they are more just
or more manly, and it is equally possible to act justly or
soberly in a greater or less degree. But, if this ‘more or less’
is inherent in the pleasures themselves, perhaps they do not
give the right reason of it; (for this will be the case) if some
are pure and others are mixed pleasures. And why should
it not be the case, that as health, which is a definite state,
yet admits of degrees, so also pleasure? For there is not
the same constitution in all; nor is health at all times the

1. And yet both of these are
good.
2. The definition of ἀρετήν,
Plat. Phileb. p. 24. A.
3. The words commonly added
after ὑπάρχειν, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς,
seem to have crept in from a gloss or
a var. lect. of the preceding καὶ τὰς
ἄλλας ἄρετας—ἐναργῶς, which is
generally taken with φασὶ, may quite
as well be construed with ὑπάρχειν,
‘manifestly are’ &c.
4. Not in the feeling of them,
tὸ ἡδεσθαί.
5. A man cannot be more than
healthy, though he may be more or
less in health.

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same in the same person, but it remains in a somewhat relaxed state up to a certain point, and differs in being 'more or less' health. Such then may also be the case with pleasure.

Again, they assume that the good is final, and that movements and generations are imperfect; and then they try to show that pleasure is a movement and a generation. But they do not seem to be right even in saying that pleasure is a 'movement' at all; for it appears that to every movement quickness or slowness naturally attaches, if not by itself, as in the movement of the universe, yet relatively at least. Now to pleasure neither of these conditions attaches; for though it is possible to be

1. Beyond which it would not be ἀγήλεον, but ὀξός.
2. Beyond a certain point, a pleasure might become a λύπη, e. g. in reading a book, however interesting, when you were wearied.
3. And therefore is ἀτέλης, short of finality, and requiring something beyond it. It was easy to call ἤδονη a κίνησις, a stirring of the soul, or emotion: but the κίνησις technically called 'imperfect' are states of transition, e. g. from non-being into being, from old to young, from little to big &c., and these can only have their τέλος when the new state is fully established, and perhaps not even then.
4. Plat. Theatet. p. 156. D.
5. Since one thing changes sooner than another. By the κίνησις κόσμου the apparent περιφορά or πόλος of the heavens seems to be meant, with the different periods of the planets.
pleased quickly, as to be made angry; yet it is not possible to be in the state of pleasure quickly,¹ nor relatively to another person, albeit one may walk or grow &c. (quicker or slower than another). Thus the passing into a state of pleasure quickly or slowly is possible, but the being in an active state of pleasure quickly,—I mean, the being pleased,—is impossible. And how can pleasure be a "generation?"²

5 For it does not appear that anything is produced out of anything, but that what a thing is produced from, into that it is resolved.³ But⁴ of that state, of which pleasure is the creating cause, pain is the destruction.

We are further told that pain is a deficiency in something that is natural to us, and that pleasure is a satisfying of it; but these are bodily feelings; hence, if pleasure is a

1. We cannot well render in English the exact difference between ἡδονή, the single and complete feeling of pleasure, and ἡδεσθαί, the being permanently pleased.

2. Wood is formed out of carbon, and into carbon it returns; you can’t make lime out of cheese, or turn cheese into lime. Now the feeling of satisfaction produced by pleasure does not return into anything; it is actually destroyed by the contrary feeling of pain. Consequently, ἡδονή is no true γένεσις. Mr. Williams’ version of the passage is not very explicit: “For it is held that the poles of such a process are not arbitrary, but that each pole is resolved back again into that out of which it was originally generated; and that pain is the process by which is destroyed that state or condition, in the production of which pleasure consists.”

3. For καὶ I should read καίτοι.
satisfying of a natural want, that in which the satisfaction takes place would be that in which the pleasure also is felt, *i. e.* the body. But this is not considered to be the case; and therefore pleasure is not a satisfying. All we can say is, that when a satisfying takes place, a man may feel pleasure, as when he submits to an operation he would feel pain.

In fact, this opinion seems to have arisen from the pleasures and discomforts connected with our food: for when we get faint, and have felt pain first, we feel pleasure at filling up the void.

But this is not the case with all the pleasures; for those connected with learning are unattended by any pain, and among the pleasures of sense, those which come through smell; and much of what we hear or see and memories and hopes. Of what then can these pleasures be the producing causes? For there have not been wants of anything of which there could be a satisfaction.

To those who cite the disreputable sorts of pleasure one

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1. "As a proof that all pleasures *ēnēa* and *anapλήρωσις*, and there-
   are bad," adds Mr. Williams. *fore as being pleasures.*

Rather, perhaps, "as implying
may fairly reply, that these are not really pleasant. For we ought not, because they are pleasant to the wrongly disposed, to think they are generally pleasant, or to any but these; just as things that are wholesome or sweet or bitter to the sick, are not so to all, and as things are not really white that seem so to those suffering from ophthalmia. Or 5 should we say, under these circumstances, 1 that the pleasures are choice-worthy, only not from these sources: just as wealth is, but not to a traitor, or health, but not to one who has to eat anything.

Or may we say that pleasures differ in kind? for those coming from proper sources are different from those which 10 come from bad, and a man cannot feel the satisfaction of the just man unless he is just, nor that of the musician unless he is musical; and so on with the rest.

Further, the friend as distinguished from the flatterer appears to show that pleasure is not a good, or at least, that pleasures differ in kind. For the friend is considered to

1. When the pleasures are disreputable.

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keep company with us for good, but the flatterer for pleasure; and to the latter it is made a matter of reproach, while the former they praise, as associating with us for other purposes.

No one, too, would choose to live with the understanding of a child all his life, though pleased in the highest degree by childish amusements, nor to feel delight in doing something very disgraceful, even if he were sure never to be painsed. On the other hand, there are many things we should take interest in, even if they brought us no pleasure, as in seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the various virtues. And though these things are of necessity attended by pleasures of their own, that makes no difference; for we should choose them even if no pleasure resulted from them.

To sum up: that pleasure is not the good seems to be as plain, as that not all pleasure is choice-worthy; and also that there are some, differing in their kind, or in the source...
whence they are derived, which are choice-worthy on their own account. Let this then suffice as an account of what is commonly said about pleasure and pain.

III. But what pleasure is, and of what nature, will perhaps become more clear if we take up the subject again from the beginning.

5 The act of sight is considered to be complete in itself at any moment: it requires nothing, the subsequent addition of which will make it perfect in its kind. Now pleasure is like something of the same sort: it is a thing whole and complete, and you could not at any time take a particular pleasure and say, ‘If this pleasure lasts longer, it will be quite perfect in its kind.’ For this reason it is not a ‘movement’ either; for all movement takes some time, and relates to some end, as housebuilding is complete as soon as it has finished what it aims at; and therefore either in the whole time required, or in some particular part of it.

1. On the same principle that a wall will not be whiter because it takes a longer time.
3. When the whole house is finished, which has taken, say, a year to build; or when the roof, or chimneys, or glazing of the windows has been completed.

Any public or private build-
Only, all the movements and progress made in the parts of the whole time are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole and from one another. The putting together of the stones is different from the fluting of the columns,¹ and both these from the building of the temple. And the building of the temple² indeed is complete as an act; for it wants nothing for the plan proposed; but that of the basement³ and the triglyph⁴ is incomplete; for each is a progress made only in a part. They differ therefore in kind; and it is not possible, at any moment of the time of its continuance, to find a movement that is complete in its kind; but, if complete at all, it is so in the whole time.⁵ So also in the case of walking and the other bodily movements; for the "movement in space" being defined as "a movement wherefrom and whereto," then of this there are differences in

2. Properly ἡ τοῦ ναοῦ means, the κίνησις of the ποίησις of the ναοῦ.
3. Or stone platform, ascended by steps, on which the temple stands.
4. Eaves of the roof, we should say.
5. It is the grammatical and logical difference between I was building and I have built.
Oὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει. Τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποι ὁ έν τῶν ἐν τῷ στάδιῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐτέρῳ, οὔτε τὸ διεξεύει τὴν ἑρμαμῆν τῆς κακείνης, οὐ μόνον γὰρ ἑρμαμῆν διὰ τοῦτο πεῦται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῖς οὕτως, ἐν ἐτέρῳ δ' αὐτῇ ἐκείνης. Ἀι ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλων εἰρήνης, ἐν οὖν ἐν ἀπαντὶ χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ αἱ πολλαὶ ἄτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἰδεῖ, εἰπερ τὸ πόθεν ποι ἐιδοποιῶ. Τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὀτροφίν χρόνῳ τελείων

kind, flying, walking, leaping, &c.; and not only so, but there are differences even in walking itself; for the ‘wherefrom and whereto’ is not the same in the stadium as in a portion of it, nor in one part the same as in another, nor the crossing this line the same as crossing that; for the runner does not merely go over a line, but a line which has a locality assigned to it; and this line (in such respect) is different from that.

However, the doctrine of movement has been discussed accurately in other essays. It appears that not even in the whole time is it (necessarily) complete, but the majority of movements are incomplete; and that they are different in kind, since even the ‘wherefrom’ and the ‘whereto’ constitute in themselves a class of movements. But pleasure

2. For οὐκ ἐν ἀπαντὶ χρόνῳ I venture to propose οὐδ' ἐν ἀπαντὶ χρόνῳ. For just above, the distinction was drawn between ἐν ἀπαντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ and ἐν μέρει. But here the translators (Chase and Williams) render it “complete at any given moment,” and Grant says “non in quodlibet tempore,” adding, as in duty bound, “this is of course different from ἐν ἀπαντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, and ἐν τῷ ἀπαντὶ in the preceding section.” I do not believe the addition of the article would give ἀπαντὶ ὁ χρόνος a contrary sense to ἀπαντὶ χρόνος. I think Aristotle means, that very many movements or processes are incomplete, i.e. subservient to some further end, even taking in the whole time of their accomplishment; e.g. a house, even when quite finished, may only be intended as the commencement of a new terrace, and the terrace that of a new town. To these κινήσεως pleasure is strongly opposed, as being complete in any moment of time, as in seeing a picture, smelling a sweet scent, tasting a delicacy, &c.
belongs to a class of things that are complete at any given moment. Hence it is clear that pleasure and 'movements' are different from each other, and that pleasure belongs to things that are whole and complete. And this would seem to be the case also from the fact, that there cannot be movement except in a certain time, but there can be pleasure; for that which is at the moment present, is a kind of whole.

5 From these considerations it is also clear that men do not rightly call pleasure a 'movement' or a 'creation out of something'; for these terms are not applied to all things, but only to such things as are resolvable into parts,¹ and not wholes. Thus, in the act of sight, there is no production from another state; nor in a point, nor in a unit.² For none of these is there a movement, or a creation; so neither is there in pleasure; for it is of the nature of a whole.

10 Now, as all sense operates on the sensuous,³ and perfectly, only when it is in good condition, and on the most

¹. We could talk of the γένεσις of granite from felspar, mica, and quartz; but not of gold, which we know of only as a whole, or of an atom.

². Because they can only be regarded as 'wholes.'

³. As sight on the visible, ὑποστάσις πρὸς τὸ ὑπόσταν.
beautiful of objects which come under the province of sense, (for indeed this seems the very nature of perfect working; and we need not here dwell on the difference between the working of a sense, and the working of the organ in which the sense resides,¹)—(it may be laid down as an axiom that) in every case the best working is that of the organ in its best state on the best object within its particular province.²

And as this kind of sense will be the most perfect, so it will confer the greatest amount of pleasure. For every act of sense has its pleasure, as well as every idea taken in by the mind and considered; and that has the greatest pleasure which is the most perfect. That, again, is most perfect which is the operation of a faculty in a good condition upon the most excellent of the objects within its province.

Now it is the pleasure resulting that gives a zest and a finish to the operation; yet not in the same way as the excellence of the object perceived and that of the perception are said to finish or make it perfect.³ So health is not the

¹. Whether it is our sight that sees, or our eye, in which the faculty of sight resides.

². The most perfect kind of sight is that of a keen-seeing eye directed to the most beautiful picture placed in the most favourable light.

³. The pleasure of seeing a good picture is the looked for result and object, the τέλος, of looking at it.
same cause of our being healthy as is the physician. And that each sense has its peculiar pleasure is evident; for we say that sights and sounds are pleasant; and it is further evident that this is so in the highest degree whenever the sense is very excellent, and has its action on an object which is equally so. And when both the sensuous and the sentient are in this state, there will always be the pleasure,—that is, of course, when there exists an object that shall cause it, and a faculty which shall feel it.\footnote{1}

But when we say ‘the pleasure gives the finish to the act,’ it is not as the 	extit{state} of pleasure existing in us, but as an end consequent on an act,\footnote{2} much as the youthful bloom is the finishing grace to those in the prime of life. And so long as ever the thing thought of or perceived is such as it should be, and also the faculty that discerns or considers it, the pleasure will be found in the act. For when the passive and the active\footnote{3} are of the like kind, and have the same

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\begin{footnotes}
\item 1. Since patient and agent are always correlative, and one necessarily implies the other (Plat. Theet. p. 157. \textit{A.})
\item 2. “Not as might some definite quality continuously existing in its object, but rather as an additional flush of perfection,” Williams. “Not in the way of an inherent state, but as a supervening flush.” Chase.
\item 3. \textit{E.g. the picture and the eye.}
\end{footnotes}
relations to each other, it is natural that the same result should follow.  

How then does it happen that no one feels pleasure continuously? Is it that he becomes tired? The fact is, all human faculties are incapacitated for continuous action; and so, in the absence of that, there cannot be pleasure, for that is consequent on the action of the faculties. Some things moreover please us because they are new, but not equally so afterwards for the same reason; at first the attention is called to them, and acts upon them with a continuous strain, as those who look at some object do act so with their faculty of sight. But after a time the action becomes, not of this kind, but slackened and remiss; and thus the pleasure also is less intense.

10 One might suppose too that all without exception have

By ὁμοίως, 'of the like kind,' he may mean either στουδάλως, good in their way, or akin to each other, as the eye, and not the ear or the nose, is to a picture. The latter sense probably is conveyed by πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχοντων.

1. As in the γένεσις of children from healthy or unhealthy parents.
2. i.e. if there is ἴδων in ἐνέργεια,—for ἐνέργεια may be συνεχῆς.

It is, however, quite possible to feel continuous pleasure, as a naturalist would in a day’s ramble in the country, a poet or a musician when engaged for hours together in his favourite pursuit. Aristotle seems to speak of a permanent state of pleasure.

3. I should read παρακέκλητα, not παρακέκληται, which they translate ‘is roused,’ or ‘is stimulated.”
an appetite for pleasure, because they all have a fondness for life. Now life is a state of active working, and every man is employed on and about those things which he also most likes. For instance, the musician is engaged with his faculty of hearing in connexion with music; the student with his intellect is busy on his speculations, and so on with the rest according to each man’s taste. And as pleasure gives the finish to our energies, so it does to the active life which men have a fondness for. Naturally therefore men make this pleasure also their direct aim, since it makes active life complete and perfect to every one, and every one holds such life to be choiceworthy.¹

V. Whether we like life for pleasure’s sake, or pleasure for life’s sake,² is a question that at present may be dismissed. In fact, these two things seem to be closely connected, and not to admit of separation. For as without activity there is no pleasure, so all activity is made perfect by the pleasure resulting from it.³

¹. Pleasure gives the crowning zest to an active life, which of itself is desirable on other accounts.  2. As something necessary to make life perfect.  3. “Without pleasure no activity can be perfect.” Williams.
And this is why pleasures are thought to differ in kind; for things different in kind we consider to be made complete by qualities that are themselves different. This is plainly the case in natural objects, and in the products of art; in animals and trees, for instance, and also in pictures and statues, in a house and an article of furniture. In the same way then we conceive that the efforts and energies that are different in kind are made complete by results also different in kind. Now the workings of the intellect do differ from those of the senses; and these again differ from each other specifically. Therefore, so also do the pleasures which make them complete. This will further appear from the intimate relation between each of the pleasures and the particular action to which such pleasure imparts a zest; for the action is advanced by its own proper pleasure, so we know that those who work with a zest judge better in each case and bring things to a more

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1. In each of these the perfection of the thing is essentially different; what makes a perfect horse, speed or good temper, does not make a perfect house, warmth or convenience in the plan, &c.
accurate result. For instance, those become clever in geometry who take a pleasure in the study of it, and understand each point more thoroughly. So also with persons fond of music, or fond of architecture, and all other professors of art,—each improves in his own art by taking pleasure in it. Therefore the pleasure in every case advances the action; and a thing can only be advanced and improved by that which has an affinity to it. But things

5 peculiar to other things that differ in kind, must themselves also differ in kind.¹

This truth² would still more clearly appear from the fact that the pleasures resulting from other pursuits obstruct and impede the exercise of the energies generally. Men fond of flute music cannot attend to the subjects they are discoursing on, if they should hear a person performing on the flute, because they take more pleasure in the flut-player's art than in the subject on which they are at the

10 time engaged. Hence the pleasure attendant on flute-playing spoils the interest they had in their talk. The same result happens in the case of other pursuits, whenever a man

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¹. Perhaps, τὰ οἶκεία καὶ αὕτα ². That pleasures are different in kind.
is engaged on more than one at the same time: the more pleasing pursuit drives out the other, and if it is very superior in its pleasantness, then so much the more, so that he does not work at the other at all. This is why, when we take very great pleasure in anything, we do nothing else; and we do other things when we are but slightly pleased with something else, as those who are in the habit of eating cakes in the theatres do this most whenever the actors are second-rate.

Since then its own peculiar pleasure tends to give accuracy to our own performances, and makes them more lasting and better, while alien pleasures injure them, it is clear that pleasures do widely differ. For indeed alien pleasures have much the same effect as proper pains; I mean, our 10 energies are weakened by the attendant trouble or annoyance; as, if people find it irksome and disagreeable to write or to reckon, then this one does not write and that man does not reckon, because the operation in each case is painful. Hence in all our actions the contrary results are

1. Or, "very different." not to any great degree, ὡς πάντως.
2. "We do not at all (or, do another thing."
produced by their own peculiar pleasures and pains. (And by peculiar I mean such as result upon each act considered only in itself\(^1\)).

Now alien pleasures,\(^2\) it has been already said, have an effect somewhat similar to the proper pain; they damage the action, though not in the same way.\(^3\)

Further, as the energies differ in goodness and badness, and as some of them are such as we should choose, others such as we should avoid, others again indifferent; it follows that the attendant pleasures are in the same position, as every action has a pleasure of its own: the pleasure peculiar to a good action is of a right kind, but that peculiar to a vitiating action is bad. (This is clearly the case, because) even the desires of what is good are laudable, as those of what is bad are blameable; but the pleasures taken in ac-

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1. Without regarding ulterior consequences. The construction of \(\kappaα\θ\ αυτ\υ\) is irregular; but the sense virtually is, \(\alphaυ\ \epsilonν\γε\ρ\υ\αι\ αυτ\υ\ \kappaα\θ\ αυτ\υ\ \ς\υ\ν\ε\φ\ε\λ\κ\ε\ι\.

2. To complete this sentence logically, a clause is wanting of this kind: \("Congenial pleasures, then, improve the action in every case,\) while alien pleasures," &c. The author lost the thread of the argument in the antithesis between \(οι\κ\ε\ι\α\) and \(\alphaλ\λ\ο\τ\ρ\ι\αι\).

3. Because \(\alphaλ\λ\ο\τ\ρ\ι\αι\ \ς\υ\δ\ο\υ\) draws away to some other \(\epsilonν\γε\ρ\υ\αι\), while \(οι\κ\ε\ι\α\ \λυ\π\υ\) simply deters from the act which it attends.
tions are more directly connected with them than are the desires for them; the latter being distinguished from the former not only by differences of time, but by their very nature; whereas the pleasures are close upon the actions, and indeed so inseparable, as to involve a doubt whether the action be not identical with the pleasure. However (this view can hardly be maintained; for) it does not appear that pleasure is either an intellectual act or a sense, for that is absurd. It is only from their not being separated that they appear to some to be the same.

As then the acts are different, so are the crowning and attendant pleasures. Now sight differs from touch in clearness, and hearing and smell from taste. In the same way therefore the pleasures differ; the intellectual from the sensual, and those of each kind from each other.

It seems moreover that each creature has a pleasure, as

1. Since a desire to do something is often felt for years before the attempt is made.
2. It appears to be so in our familiar phrase, “No trouble, but rather a pleasure.”
3. Both of which are ἐνεργεῖαι.
4. i.e. from the fact that pleasure closely attends ἐνεργεῖαι.
5. In Plat. Phædo, p. 65. B., ὄψις and ἀκοή are placed first of all the senses in respect of certainty.
6. Or perhaps, “and of these, the pleasures of intellect differ (as do those of sense), and each (intellectual and sensual) from each other.”
it has also a function, peculiar to itself; and that pleasure is, the one according to its kind of action. And this will appear on consideration in every instance; the pleasure of the horse is one, that of a dog or a man another; as Heraclitus says that an ass would choose a handful of rubbish rather than gold, because food is more agreeable to asses than gold. The pleasures therefore of creatures different in kind themselves differ in kind, and it ought to follow, that those of the same kind are not different. And yet, in the case of men at least, they do differ not a little, for the same things please some people and vex others; and things that are painful and odious to some, are agreeable and welcome to others. And this occurs also in the case of sweet things; not the same seem sweet to one in a fever as to one in health, just as what is warm to one in robust health is not so to the invalid; and this happens similarly in other things also.

Now in all these cases we consider that to be, which appears so to the person in a good state of mind or body.
And if this is rightly said, as it seems to be, and excellence is the standard measure of each thing, and the good man, as such; then those will be pleasures which appear to him to be such, and those things pleasant in which he delights. And if things disagreeable to him seem pleasant to another, that is not surprising; for there are many ways in which men get spoilt and become worse, and so these things are not really pleasant, but only in the opinion of these, and in these dispositions.

It is evident therefore that we must not allow such as are confessedly discreditable to be pleasures at all, except to the depraved. But of those pleasures which are commonly held to be respectable, what particular pleasure, or what sort, should we say is man’s? Or is the answer plain from considering the peculiar actions of man, since his pleasures attend upon these? Whether then there is one, or more than one, pleasure of the perfect and blessed man, the pleasures which complete these actions will properly be called the pleasures of man. The other pleasures are so in a

1. qua bonus, i. e. without regard to any other special faculty.

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secondary degree and in a small proportion, like the actions to which they belong.\(^1\)

VI. Now that we have spoken on the subject of the virtues, and also of friendships and pleasures, it remains to discuss happiness in a general way, since we lay it down as the end of human action. If then we take up again what was before said, the argument will be more concise.

We said then that it is not merely a mental state; for in that case a man might have happiness if he slept all his life, and so lived like a plant\(^2\); or if he suffered the greatest misfortunes. If then this view does not commend itself, but we should rather put happiness in the class of active workings, as has before been stated; if, moreover, of these workings some are necessary and to be undertaken for other ends,\(^3\) and others on their own account; it is evident

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1. The pleasure of φόρησις, for instance, would be the crowning pleasure of rational man; the pleasures of mere sense would be secondary, because the exercise of these faculties is less important, and is common to man and animals.

2. Without activity.

3. As the operation of eating for securing life and health &c.
that we must put down happiness among those that are choice-worthy for their own sake, and not among those which are so for some other purpose. For happiness stands in need of nothing,1 but is self-sufficing. And those acts are of themselves choice-worthy from which nothing is looked for beyond the mere action; and such we consider to be the actions in accordance with virtue, (since the doing what is good and honourable is one of the things which are choice-worthy on their own account,) and also those amusements which give pleasure;2 for these are chosen for no other ends, and indeed more harm comes of them than good, because people practise them in disregard of their persons or their properties. And yet3 it is to amusements of this kind that the majority of those called happy have recourse; and this is why those who are clever in such pastimes are held in repute in the courts of tyrants; for they make them-

1. It is τέλος, final in itself, and requires no other τέλος to crown or complete it.
2. Opposed to those which are επιτομος or λυπηρος for some end, as games or exercises for purposes of health.
3. So strong is the passion for ηθος as the end of action.
toioiōtov. Apokē mēn oūn eudaïmonikā tauta einai diā tōν dē

δυναστείας ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, oūdeîn δ᾿ ἵσως σήμειον oι τοιούτου εἰσίν· ou γάρ ἐν tō dυναστείας ἡ ἀρετή oúde o nóus, ἀφ᾿ oûn aι σπουδαἰαὶ ἐνέργειαι· oúde

5 eἰ ἄγενστοι oύτω δύνεις ἱδυρίης εἰλικρινοὺς καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν ἐπὶ tᾶς σωματικᾶς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τούτο ταῦτα oἰητέων αἱρετωτέρας εἰναι καὶ γὰρ oὶ παιδεῖς tὰ παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς τιμῶμενα κράτιστα oἴονται εἰναι. "Εὐλογον δ᾿,

6 ὡσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἔτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὔτω

10 καὶ φαύλους καὶ ἑπιεικέσιον. Καθάπερ oûn πολλάκις εἰρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἱδέα ἕστι tὰ tῷ σπουδαῖῳ τοιαῦτα δύναται· ἐκάστῳ δ᾿ ἡ κατὰ tὴν oἰκείαν ἔξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ tῷ σπουδαῖῳ δεὶ ἡ κατὰ tὴν ἀρετὴν. Οὐκ
selves agreeable in such pursuits as the great men like; and they want men of this sort. These pursuits then are considered conducive to happiness, because those in places of dignity devote their leisure to them. Perhaps however

5 men of this kind are no rule. For no virtue, no intellect, resides in the mere fact of being a great man; but it is from these qualities that the good actions proceed. Nor again, if these men, never having tasted pure and gentlemanly pleasure, betake themselves to bodily indulgences, ought we on that account to think these more choice-worthy. For even children consider that what they hold in regard is really the best. It is to be expected therefore, that as boys and men have different ideas about the value of things, so also will the good and the bad. We conclude then, (as has often been stated,) that those things are really valuable and pleasant which seem so to the good man; and as to every one that course of action is most worthy of pursuit which accords with his peculiar tastes and habits, so to the good

1. Or, "it is not in being a potentate that virtue or mind resides."
man is that which accords with virtue. It is not in amusement then that virtue consists; for indeed it is absurd to suppose that the end and object of life is pastime, and that men should busy themselves and endure hardships all their lives for the sake of mere sport. For everything, one may say, we choose with a view to something else, except happiness; for this is the end of all action. But to be in earnest and to take trouble for the sake of amusement, does seem foolish and quite childish; albeit the converse, to indulge in play that one may work in earnest, as Anacharsis says, appears to be right. For pastime is like rest; and it is because men cannot continuously labour, that that they require rest. We cannot therefore say that rest is the end, for it is but a means to the activity that follows it. Besides, the happy life is thought to be one in accordance with virtue; and this is a life in earnest, and not one in sport. Lastly, we say that the serious is better than the droll and

1. Such sport not being a τέλος, as he goes on to argue.

2. An ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν and therefore not a παιδία.

3. Σπουδαῖος, like ἐπίευχος, and the well-known ἐνέργεια, hardly admits of an English rendering. The argument is, that the serious and important must ever be better than the frivolous and trifling; and the better the faculty, the better the deed; therefore, happiness as an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς is of more importance as an end than pleasure as a bodily emotion.

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the sportive; and the better anything is, be it a member or a man, the more important is the result of its action. But the action of that which is better is superior in kind, and so more allied to happiness. Now any one can enjoy bodily 5 pleasures, and a slave as well as the best-born. But no one allows a share of happiness to a slave, except so far as he allows him subsistence.¹ No! it is not in such diversions (as bodily pleasures) that happiness consists, but in a course of action consistent with virtue, as has before been said.

VII. Well, then, if happiness really is 'a course of 10 action according to the dictates of virtue,' it is reasonable to suppose that the excellence meant by virtue will be of the highest kind,—that is, the excellence of the part of us which is best. And whether this is intellect, or some other principle which is thought by some natural law to be our ruler and guide, and to be capable of ideas respecting the

¹. He feeds him and keeps him alive; and life itself is an ἐνέργεια μεθ’ ἠδονῆς. Mr. Williams, I think, mistakes the meaning in rendering it, “But that a slave has any portion in happiness no one grants, any more than that he enjoys the life of a freeman and a citizen.”
good and the divine, (either as being of itself divine, or as the most godlike of our human faculties); the action of this according to its own peculiar excellence will be perfect happiness. And that this action is contemplative has already been said. Now this would seem to agree with our former statements as well as with the actual truth: for this kind of action is the best (since Mind is the best of our faculties, and of the subjects of knowledge, those are the best with which Mind has to deal), as well as the most continuous; for there is nothing we are able to do continuously so much as to think. Again, we hold that happiness must have some admixture of pleasure; and confessedly of all action in accordance with excellence, that which follows the course of philosophy is the most pleasant. At least, it is generally held that philosophy has pleasures which claim our especial regard for their unmixed as well as for their enduring nature; and it may be fairly presumed that this pleasure is even greater to adepts in than to students of philosophy.

Moreover, what is called the self-sufficiency principle may

1. Not the subjects of were ἔσθενων.
be said to hold in a special degree in the action of contemplation. For, granting that the mere necessities of life are required by the wise and the just and by all others; still, when men are sufficiently supplied with these, the just man requires some others towards whom and with whom he may practice justice; and so also the man of self-control and the brave man, and each of the other followers of virtue. But the philosopher can think even by himself; and the more, the wiser he is. Perhaps indeed he can do so still better if he has fellow-workers; but still, of all men in the world he is the most independent.

Again, the faculty of contemplation would seem to be the only one that is prized for its own sake, since nothing comes of it beside the having thought; whereas from things which are general subjects of human action we expect to get more or less over and above the mere doing of them.

1. Which form a general condition of happiness, as far as externals go. But if ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν requires also some externals, (as justice does, being a purely relative virtue,) the happiness resulting must be some extent dependant on chance; which is not the case with θεωρητική.

2. As a man would look for profit or praise, or at least the conferring some public benefit, by writing a book.
Happiness is also thought to consist in a state of leisure. For we busy ourselves in order that we may enjoy leisure, just as we make war that we may have peace. Now the practical virtues have their exercise [principally] either in the sphere of politics or of war; and the actions in these departments are considered to be of a busy kind,—those of war indeed wholly so. For no one chooses war for war’s sake, nor tries to get up a war; for he would be thought downright blood-thirsty if he made enemies of his friends merely that battles and slaughterings should be brought about. But the action of the statesmen is also a busy one, and one which, beside the actual work of governing, endeavours to secure places of power and honour, or at

1. Virtually, this is an Epicurean doctrine: that τὸ λιαν ἐπίστομον is inconsistent with perfect happiness. Aristotle says this, though he holds happiness to be an ἐνέργεια, and he cites cases to shew that the real object of many ἐνέργειαι is to secure a consequent state of repose. He wants to prove, that θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια attains this end at less cost of labour than any other ἐνέργειαι which are πρακτικαὶ.

2. The talents or the genius which is devoted not to mere contemplation, but to moral action, or action resulting from will and moral choice (vi. 2, 4.) It may be suggested, that after ἡ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς the word μᾶλιστα has dropped out, since war and politics are not the sole objects of πράξεως. Mr. Chase renders it, “Now all the practical virtues require either society or war for their working.” Can we say this is a true proposition? For this end a single person would suffice. The words below, αἱ πολιτικοὶ καὶ πολεμικοὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, seem almost necessarily to require μᾶλιστα in this place.

3. As he might choose θεωρητικὴ for its own sake.
least, happiness for himself and the citizens, in a different sense from the general happiness which is the object of our inquiry.  

If then of the moral actions conformable to the virtues those concerned with politics and war stand first in point of honour and greatness; if these are ever busy, and aim at some further end, and are not choice-worthy in themselves; if the exercise of the intellect, being contemplative, is thought both to surpass these in earnestness, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to have a pleasure peculiar to it, and that pleasure tends to promote that exercise; if, in fine, the conditions of self-sufficiency, of rest when we please, and of never being tired out, (speaking humanly,) and all such other conditions as are commonly assigned to the truly happy man, can be shown to belong to this kind

1. The individual or particular happiness of every citizen, as distinct from aggregate happiness, in the sense in which people say "England is a happy country."

2. Meaning, probably, in the "Politics" viewed as a sequel to Ethics. The words δῆλον ὡς ἐτέραν ὑδάμων appear to me spurious. Mr. Williams translates, or rather paraphrases, thus: "and that happiness is not to be identified with an active political life, we have shown by the fact, that in our search for each we invariably regard it as a something distinct from the other." I doubt if the Greek can mean so much.
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK X.

λαβόντα μήκος βίον τέλειον, ουδέν γὰρ ύπερ λελείστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. Ὅ τε τοιοῦτος ἂν εἰη βίος κρείττων ἡ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θείαν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει: δόσῃ δὲ 5 διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συμβέτου, τοσοῦτοι καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀλλην ἀρετήν. Εἰ δὴ θείον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τούτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπινον βίον. Οὐ χρῆ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παρανόητους ἀνθρώπους φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὑπάρχει οὐδέθεν τὰ ἢ 10 θυγατέρες, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον εὑρέσθαι ἀθανασίαν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐξήν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ: εἰ

of action, —then this must be man's perfect happiness, provided it has attained a duration of life sufficient for carrying it out; since none of the conditions of happiness can be left incomplete.

But then a life of this kind will be too high for a human being; for it is not as a man that he will live so, but as something divine is inherent in him. And in proportion as this surpasses the composite, so does the exercise of it surpass that according to any other kind of virtue. If then Mind is divine as compared with Man, so too is the life devoted to mind divine as compared with the natural life of the man.

Nevertheless, a man ought not to follow the advice of those who say that as a man one should think like a man, or as a mortal like a mortal, but as far as is possible to aspire to be immortal, and to do everything towards living according to the best and highest of the faculties in

1. Viz. the thewrontikē.
2. See i. 9, 10.
3. As the φρόνημα per se is better than νοῦς + σώμα.
4. Euripides and others, who made this a common law. This sentiment of Aristotle's is a very
5. Compare Herod. iv. 93.

noble one, and fills us with admiration at the aspirations to which Greek philosophy had attained. It is the more remarkable, because the doctrine and belief in a future life formed no part of Aristotle's creed.

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VIII. Second in happiness is the life that is conformed to virtue in general. For the efforts we make in this direction are such as are proper for man; we do acts that are honest and courageous and according to the other virtues.

1. Or, “trifling in pretension,” i.e. less conspicuous than some other faculties.

2. As Euripides says Alc. 301. ψυχή γάρ αὐθέν ἡτει τιμώτερον.

3. Read ἐκαστος, not ἐκαστοι. This is the origin of the saying “Mens cujusque est quisque.”

4. They are not supernatural, have less of the τὸ θεῖον than pure ἁπάνθεμος.

5. Lit. “others that are in accordance with the virtues.” The other cardinal virtues, he seems to mean. Aristotle here shows that general virtue has essentially to do with our fellow men, while theρητικῇ is concerned chiefly with oneself. According to our modern views, this would be the philanthropic life, or life of active benevolence, contrasted with the ascetic.
one towards another, in dealings, in cases of need, and in actions of every kind, nay, even in the matter of the feelings, by carefully observing what is proper for each; and all these are evidently within the scope of human action. Some kinds of goodness too are thought to result from bodily constitution, and that in many respects moral virtue is closely connected with the passions. So also good sense is closely associated with moral worth, and this again with good sense, inasmuch as the principles of sound sense must be in accordance with the moral virtues, and what is right in morals must be in accordance with right judgment. But moral virtues are connected with the passions, and so must have to do with mixed mind and body; and the virtues of such a composite nature are proper only to men. So also then will be the life and the happiness in accordance with them, while the excellence of the mind is entirely

1. i.e. so as not to hurt other peoples' feelings. Or perhaps, 'in the control of the passions.'
2. As σωφροσύνη, or chastity.
3. See vi. ch. 2, ὅσιν ἰδον ἱδίκησιν ἔστιν ἐξεστὶν πραγματείας &c. They act and react, as it were, on each other.

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distinct.¹ (This is briefly stated,) for only thus much can be said about it here; since to discuss the doctrine with exactness is too great for our present purpose.²

It would seem too that the intellectual life requires a supply of external goods to a small extent, or less so than the happiness that attends the practice of moral virtue.³ For, granting that of mere necessities both have need, and in an equal degree,—albeit your public man does take more trouble about his person, and the like is true in other cases,⁴ for there will be some small differences;—yet in respect of the course of action of each⁵ there will be a considerable difference. The liberal man will require money for doing liberal acts; and the honest man for his repayments,—mere intentions being uncertain, since even the dishonest pretend to wish to act honestly,—and so too the brave man will want the power to exercise his bravery, if he is to perform a brave act,⁶ and the man of self-control

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¹ As being θείων τι, sup. vii.
² Or, 'is a greater task than we have proposed to ourselves.'
³ Meaning, perhaps, in the πολεμικός. Mr. Chase translates, 'the man who lives in society does take more pains about his person and all that kind of thing.'
⁴ Βίος, the θεωρητικός and the πρακτικός κατ' ἄλλην ἀρετήν.
⁵ Lit. 'if he is to carry out any of the acts that are in accordance with that virtue.'
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BOOK X.

1. All these are examples of ἥ ἐκτὸς χαριτῆς, means at one's disposal for carrying out one's inclinations or disposition.

2. That is, whether the will or the deed is the essence of a virtuous action. If this passage is genuine, and not an interpolation, the point seems to be, that ἥ ἐκτὸς χαριτῆς is quite essential to the doing of a really virtuous act, and that the mere will is not enough. It is the long controverted question of "Faith without works."

3. Differently from the πρακτικὸς.

4. To be not merely θεωρητικος, which would be selfish, but to combine with this the character of πρακτικὸς. This is said, to excuse even θεωρητικοι for having some care for worldly goods. Not every man can be a philosopher in a garret.
such external aids for playing his part among his fellow men.

That perfect happiness lies in the exercise of contemplative employment would appear also from this consideration. The gods, we conceive, are beyond all other beings blessed and happy. Now, what kind of moral actions must we assign to them? Shall we say, just actions? Or will they appear in a ludicrous light as making mutual contracts, returning deposits, and doing other things of this sort? Or shall we assign to them deeds of bravery, in withstanding1 terrible sights and facing dangers, because it is glorious? Or acts of liberality? But to whom shall they give? It would be absurd too for them to have money or anything of that sort. Well, as for acts of self-control,2 in respect of what can they be exercised? Is it not an undignified kind of praise to say that they have no low tastes? And if one went through the whole list of virtues, the circumstances connected with moral actions would seem trifling and unworthy of gods.

1. Supply (ὑπολαβόντας αὐτῶς) virtues chiefly, but substitutes ὑπομένοντας &c. 'liberality' for 'prudence.'
2. He again specifies the cardinal
Yet all conceive that the gods live, and if so, that they have some action: for they certainly do not sleep like Endymion. Now for a living entity deprived of action, and still more of creation, what remains but contemplation? So that the occupation of a god, surpassing as it does in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human energies that which is most akin to this will be most nearly allied to happiness.

And a proof of this is, that the other animals have no share of happiness, being entirely deprived of any such faculty as thought. The case then stands thus: to the gods all their life is blessed; to men, in so far as some semblance of this divine faculty is vouchsafed to them; but of other animals none is happy, because in no instance do they partake of the faculty of contemplation. To whatever part then of created beings contemplation extends, so far does happiness also; and those to whom the contemplative habit belongs the more, are the happier, and that not by
theorleia aut' 

IX. Deipheide de kai tis ektois euthimerias anathropou 
ointi ou gar autarkeias he physis prois to theorein, all' 
dei kai to somma ulymavenei kai trophi kai tis loiphe 
therapeioun uparxein. Oi 

The accident, but because of their contemplativeness\textsuperscript{1}; for this 
is in itself precious; so that happiness may be regarded as 
a kind of faculty of observation.\textsuperscript{2}

IX. He will however also need external prosperity, since 
he is but a man; for his nature is not of itself able to pass 
a life of thought, but the body too must be in health, and 
food and other comforts must be supplied. Not that we are 
to suppose that, in order to be happy, he will require many 
and great goods, simply because it is not possible, without 
some external goods, to attain a high state of blessedness. 
No! sufficiency does not consist in excess, nor does the 
scope for moral action.\textsuperscript{3} It is possible even for those who 
do not rule land and sea to do what is right; for even with 
moderate means a man might act in accordance with virtue, 
as may clearly be seen by the fact that private persons are 
supposed to do what is reasonable quite as much as those

\textsuperscript{1} "Not because thinking indirectly leads to happiness, but 
rather because the two are essentially convertible." Mr. Williams.

\textsuperscript{2} Perhaps a play on the sense, 'a sort of (mental) sight-seeing.'

\textsuperscript{3} Some copies insert od' he 

kraisei after autarkeis. Compare ch. 
v. 2, 

\textsuperscript{4} Mr. Williams renders it, "some 

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1. Lit. "if acting is taken away." 2. But only of ἢδων, which is όθαρος, τὸ πράττειν ἀφαιρομένῳ. not εὐδαιμονία.
the contemplation of things, and not the contemplation of men. *οτί εκ της ευδαιμονίας θεωρίας.

IX. When we speak of a man and of his life, we mean by a man a man of the body and of the soul. *οὗ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ τὸ σώμα ἰσχυρεῖται καὶ τὴν λουτρήν θεραπεύειν ὑπάρχειν. Οὐ μὴν οὖν ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων διήσεων τῶν ευδαιμονίας, εἴ μὴ εἰκότως ἄνευ τῶν ἀκατακόρον μακάριων εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐπερεβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκης οὖν ἐκ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχουσα γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης πράττειν τὰ καλά, καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναις οὐ γὰρ πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐστιν ἔδειν ἐναργώς νεικίσθαι τῶν

accident, but because of their contemplativeness; for this is in itself precious; so that happiness may be regarded as a kind of faculty of observation.

IX. He will however also need external prosperity, since he is but a man; for his nature is not of itself able to pass a life of thought, but the body too must be in health, and food and other comforts must be supplied. Not that we are to suppose that, in order to be happy, he will require many and great goods, simply because it is not possible, without some external goods, to attain a high state of blessedness. No! sufficiency does not consist in excess, nor does the scope for moral action. It is possible even for those who do not rule land and sea to do what is right; for even with moderate means a man might act in accordance with virtue, as may clearly be seen by the fact that private persons are supposed to do what is reasonable quite as much as those

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in power, perhaps even more so. Thus it is enough that just so much¹ should be supplied; for a man’s life will be happy if he employs his means in the way of virtue.

And Solon perhaps well declared whom he considered happy, in saying they were “persons moderately supplied with external goods, who had performed the noblest acts according to their means,² and had lived soberly;” for it is possible for men of moderate means to do what they ought.

Anaxagoras too appears to have conceived the happy man not as one either rich or powerful; for he said that he should not be surprised if he appeared to the multitude an out-of-the-way person,³ for they judge by externals, and have no perception of anything but these. Thus the opinions of the wise seem to agree with our statements.⁴

Now, though coincidences of this kind undoubtedly carry some conviction, yet in matters of action truth is judged of

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¹. Vis. as will enable him πράττειν κατ’ ἀρετήν.
². Reading ὡς οἶδ’ τ’ ἐν for ὡς φέτο.
³. It is not clear whether ἄτοπος refers to Anaxagoras or to εὐδαίμων.
⁴. I read συμφωνεῖν δὴ (for δὲ), and make this clause a conclusion to the statements preceding.
by the realities, that is, by actual life; for on these depends the validity of all such views. Thus we ought to consider what others have said before us by bringing it to the test of acts and of life; and if the statements agree with these facts, we should accept them, while if they are at variance, we must set them down as mere theories.¹

5 He then who exercises himself in the way of thought and worships it, seems to be in the best of all dispositions and to be the special favourite of heaven.² For if the gods have any care at all for human things, as is commonly believed, then it must also be reasonable to think that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to themselves, that is to say, Intellect; and that they requite with kindness those who love and honour this most, as persons who care for what is pleasing to them, and who act uprightly and according to their duty.³ And that all these conditions

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¹. Sup. i. § 3.
². Or, "and does his best to improve it, and has the best mental disposition, seems also to be the most beloved by the gods." A very noble and consoling sentiment to those who care little for popular notions of orthodoxy, but everything for Truth. It is humiliating to think how immeasurably the Greek philosophers surpassed us of the present day in this best and holiest of all the virtues, love of Truth.
³. It is uncertain whether ἐπιμελουμένουs agrees with the subject or the object. In favour of the former is the similar word ἐπιμέλεια.
belong especially to the philosopher is very clear. He therefore is most dear to the gods, and it is likely that the same man is also the most happy. So that even on this view, the wise man will be in an especial manner a happy man.

5 X. Are we then to suppose that, if we have sufficiently discussed, in general outlines, these subjects and the virtues, and also friendship and pleasure, our purpose in this treatise is fulfilled; or, as is commonly said, is the end and object in matters of human action not merely the having considered and gained a knowledge of them severally, but rather the carrying them out in practice? If so, neither is it enough to know about virtue; we must endeavour to have it and to use it, or to adopt any other means, if there are such, to become good.

If then the arguments employed were sufficient of them-

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1. The favour of heaven, irrespective of the use or interest of theoria, per se.
2. The relation of pleasure or contemplation to happiness.
selves to make men good, they would justly (as Theognis says) have ‘earned rewards many and great,’ and it would have been our duty to provide ourselves with these. As it is however, it is clear that, although they have influence in encouraging and inciting the generously-disposed among the young, and would make a noble and really honour-loving disposition possessed and inspired by the love of virtue; yet they are powerless to lead on the mass of mankind to a chivalrous love of goodness. The fact is, men are not naturally disposed to obey the dictates of shame, but only those of fear; in other words, they do not abstain from evil through the disgrace, but through the penalties which it brings. For living by passion they pursue their own favourite pleasures and the means of securing them, and shun the contrary pains; but of the noble and truly pleasant they have not even an idea, never having tasted it. Now by what process of reasoning can men of this kind be altered for the better? For it is not possible, or at least, not easy, to change by argument principles which have of old become
ισως εστιν ει παντων υπαρχοντων δι' διν επιφανειας
dakoymen γινεσθαι, metalaβομεν της αρετης. Γινεσθαι
δ' αγαθους οινται οι μεν φυσει οι δ' εμει οι δε διδακη. Το
μεν οιν της φυσεως δηλου ουκ ειδι ημων υπαρχει, αλλα
δια της ηεις αιτιας των ουκ ἀληθως ευτυχεσιν υπαρχει
ο δε λογος και η διδακη μη ποτ' ουκ ειν άπαιτων ισχυρη,
αλλα δει προδειριγασθαι τοις εσθει την του ακρατοτου
ψυχην προς το καλως χαρειν και μασειν, οσπερ γην την
θρεφουσαν το σπαρμα. Ου γαρ αν ακοψει λογον απο-
τρεποντος ονδε αυι συνελη ο κατα παθος ξων
των δ' ουτως
ηνιατα πως οιν τε μεταπετισαι; διως τ' ου δοκει λογω
υπεικειν το παθος αλλα βια. Δει δη το θηος προσπαρ-

part of men's characters. So perhaps we should be content,
if, with all the appliances at command which are supposed
to make us good, we have some share of general goodness.

The cause of our becoming good some think due to
nature, some to custom, others to teaching. Now what is
a gift of nature it clearly does not rest with ourselves to
possess; it is granted to the truly fortunate by some divine
5 dispensation.¹ And as for reasoning and teaching, it is to
be feared they do not prevail with all alike, but that the soul
of the pupil must have been prepared and worked before-
hand for proper liking and disliking, even as land which is
to rear up the seed. For one who lives by the dictates of
passion is not likely to listen to any dissuading argument,
or even to understand its force: and when one is in this
10 mental state, how is it possible to change his convictions?
And to speak generally, passion does not seem to yield to
reason, but only to force. It is therefore requisite that, to
begin with, the disposition should be in a manner friendly
to virtue, taking kindly to what is good, and disliking what

¹ This view very nearly reaches the good seed." The preceding
the Christian doctrine of "Grace;" υπαρχει seems to me interpolated.
what follows to the "sowing of

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χειν πως οἰκειοῦ τῆς ἄρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραίνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. 'Εκ νέου δ' ἀνωφής ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἄρετὴν χαλεπῶν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιουτοῦ τραφέντα νόμοις τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ᾔδην εἴην ὃς ἤδυ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. Διὸ νόμους δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐκ ἐσταί γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γνώμενα. Οὐχ ἵκαιον δ' ὡς νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῶν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταύτα δεσμεύθη ἄν νόμον, καὶ ὅλως ἢ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἡ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ἐπιλαλοῦσι ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Διότερον δὴν τοὺς νομοθετούντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ὑπακουομένων τῶν

is disgraceful. But from boyhood to meet with right guidance towards virtue is hard, unless one is brought up subject to virtuous laws. For to live temperately and with stern self-denial is not pleasing to the many, especially to the young. And hence the bringing up and the daily course of life ought to be regulated by laws; for these will not be the cause of annoyance when once they have become familiar. And it is not enough, perhaps, that in early life we should have proper bringing up and attention; but even when grown up we should continue to practise and accustom ourselves to them1; and on these matters it is likely we shall want laws, and indeed generally in our whole lives, since the

1. i. e. to the precepts of virtue implied in ὀρθῆ τροφῆ.
educated in their habits will obey the call; but that on the disobedient and more obstinately disposed they should impose pains and penalties, while those who are wholly incurable they should banish from the state. For they consider that the good man, and one who lives by the rule of honour, will obey reason, but the bad, whose sole aim is pleasure, should be punished by pain, like a beast of burden. And for this cause they further assert that the pains ought to be such as are especially opposed to the favourite pleasures.

Well, then, if it is necessary, as has been stated, that he who is to be good should have been well brought up and trained to good habits, and then to live thus in the practice of good ways, and neither unwittingly nor knowingly do what is bad; then these results can only be attained by those who live according to some intellectual rule and right discipline that carries with it power and authority.

1. With κολάζησθαι supply δέν from the preceding.
2. The translators miss the force of the formula εἰ δ' οὖν, (on which see my note on Ἀesch. Agam. 1009).
3. Which can require obedience and enforce it by penalties.
Now the commands of a father do not carry with them force or constraint; nor indeed those of any one man at all, unless he be a king, or hold some such high office. But the law has a constraining power, since it addresses us as the combined result of wisdom and intelligence. Then again, people are apt to hate their fellow-men who thwart their inclinations, even if they do so rightly; but the law is not an object of our dislike in imposing on us our duty. 1 Sparta is almost the only city in which the legislator seems to have concerned himself with regulating the diet and the daily practice of the citizens. In most states there is a perfect freedom 2 in such matters, and each man lives as he pleases, laying down the law for his wife and children like the Cyclops. 3

1. It is felt to be general and impartial, and not to tyrannize over individuals. The argument in what follows is connected thus: (Besides, the law does not attempt to interfere in private or domestic matters), except indeed in Sparta, &c.

2. Or, 'an absence of superintending care.' The translators render έξημέληται are 'neglected' or 'overlooked,' which implies carelessness.

3. In Od. ix. 115.
be able to effect this; still, as matters of the above kind are generally exempted from public control, it would seem to be the duty of individuals to contribute to virtue for their own children and friends, or at least, to have this aim and purpose in view. And it would further appear from what has been said, that he would be best able to do this by making himself acquainted with the principles of law-giving. For public systems of instruction are, of course, carried into effect by laws; and those are good which are controlled by well-considered laws,—(whether written or unwritten would seem to be a matter of indifference, as also whether they are systems by which one or more are to be educated, just as this is of no importance in music or gymnastics and other branches of education,) [A man, then, should learn legislation:] for, as what has force in cities is their laws and customs, so likewise in families it is the commands of the father and his customs. And this is still more the case through the relationship that subsists, and

1. i.e. a father’s commands have the greater weight.
the kindnesses done; for here we have, to begin with, children who are fond of their father and are naturally predisposed to obey. Moreover, particular modes of instruction differ from general, as does treatment in the medical art. For though ordinarily abstinence from food, with rest, suits a patient in a fever, it may not perhaps suit some one else; the man skilled in boxing too does not perhaps supply all his pupils with the same implements of attack and defence. It would seem then that particular instruction will be carried to a higher degree of perfection, because the attention is bestowed upon the individual; for thus each one better obtains the aid that he requires. But, though both a physician and a trainer, and indeed any one else with general knowledge of what is best for all, or for such and such, will manage best those placed singly under his charge; (for it is of the general that the sciences are said to, and do in fact consist;) yet there is nothing perhaps to prevent even one who has no scientific knowledge from managing well enough some particular case, if only he has observed accurately
what happens in each, and so acts on experience; just as some persons appear to be the best physicians for themselves, though they would be little able to help another. But for all this, if a person wishes to become skilled in his art, and have a theoretic knowledge of it, he ought, perhaps, to proceed step by step to a general view of it, and make himself acquainted with that view, so far as is possible; for, as we have said, it is with general conceptions that the sciences have to deal. Thus then also it may be found, that one who desires to make others better by a system of discipline, be they many or few, should try to become acquainted with the principles of legislature, if it is through laws that we are likely to become good. For to impart to any one who may be placed before you a good disposition, is not in the power of an ordinary person, but if of any one, of one possessed of knowledge, as in the case of medicine and the other arts which require attention and practical good sense.

Well, then, ought not our next consideration to be, from what source and in what way one may become learned in legislature? Or must we, as in all other mat-
nomotheitikos genont' an tis; ἡ kathaper ep' twn allon, pará twn politikon; morion gar edókei tis politikeis einai. *H ouk 'ómoina formedai ep' tis politikeis kai twn loipon épiotηmów te kai dunameon; ev men gar
5 tois allois oi avtoi faivonta tás te dunameis paradi-
dóntes kai énergóntes up' avtón, oión iatroi kai gra-
feis; tá de politiká épargýllontaí men ididáskei oi
sofistai, prattéi ap' avtón oúdeis, all' oi politenv-
menoi, ou déxaien an dunamei twn touto prattew kai
10 émpeiria mállon h diavola: outhe gar gràfountes outhe
légontes peri twn toioútow faívontaí (kaitoio kalían
hn isos h logous dikaiikous te kai demo-gerikous), oude
av politikous pepoikótes tōuς sphetérōuvs vneiws h tinais
ters, learn this from statesmen? For law-giving we made
out to be a department of social science. Or does learning
appear to be by no means the same in the case of
social science that it is in the case of the other sciences
and faculties? For in the other professions we find that
5 the same persons teach the faculties, that practise in them,
as physicians and painters; but in politics, it is the sophists
who give out that they teach the science, though none of
them is practically engaged in it, but only the members of
the government, and even these may be thought to do this
more by a kind of faculty and a sort of tact than by intel-
10 lectual effort; for we do not find that they either write or
speak on such subjects, though perhaps this would be more
creditable than to compose speeches for law-courts or for popu-
lar assemblies; nor that they ever made their own sons poli-
ticians, or any others of their friends. And yet this would have

1. Viz. which we learn from 
3. As if it were an èpiosthēn to
those skilled in them. 
2. Sir A. Grant thinks this
refers to i. 2, 7. 

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been a reasonable proceeding, if they really had the power; for neither is there any nobler inheritance they could have left to their country, nor is there anything\(^1\) they would have rather had belong to themselves or to those dearest to them, than power of this kind\(^2\). Not that it is a small amount

which mere practice seems to contribute; for they never would become politicians through merely being conversant with political science.\(^3\) It seems therefore that those who aspire to the knowledge of politics, require also some practice in them. Those indeed of the sophists who profess to teach politics, appear to be very far from doing so in reality; in fact, they are entirely ignorant of what it is, or with what it has to do; or they would not make it the same as rhetoric, or even worse; nor would they think it easy to legislate, if one first makes a collection of such laws as are

\(^1\) Perhaps \(\tauι\) has dropped out after \(\ιπάρκει\).
\(^2\) Viz. than political power.
\(^3\) “Merely breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have made Statesmen of them,” Chase. The argument is, that though practical knowledge is as essential in teaching politics as it is in medicine or painting, \&c., yet that mere practice is not enough; it requires science and experience combined.
held in repute, on the ground that one may pick out there-
from for oneself the best. As if the very selection was not
a task requiring intelligence, and right judgment a very
great matter, as in musical performances. For those alone
who are experienced in the various branches of science
judge correctly of the results, and understand by what
means and in what way they are brought about, and what
harmonises with what: the inexperienced must be content
with not failing to see if the work has been done well or
ill, as in painting. Now, as laws have an analogy to works,
as the results of political science, how could a man be-
come acquainted with the science of legislation from them,
or decide on the best? Even in medicine people do not
seem to become skilled by reading the treatises on the sub-
ject; and yet the compilers of these attempt to describe
not only the remedies, but how patients1 may be cured, and
how they ought severally to treat them, distinguishing the
different constitutions or bodily habits of each. Now, granting
that this kind of knowledge is of use to those who have expe-

1. Supplying οἱ θεραπευόμενοι from the context.


5 ἀνεπιστήμωσιν ἄχρεια. Ἡσυχία σοῦ καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυνάμενοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοιναντίον καὶ ποιὰ πολλὰς ἀρμόττει εὐχρηστά ἂν εἴη τοῖς δὲ ἄνευ ἔξεσθα τὰ τοι-5 αὐτὰ διεξοῦσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετάτερον δὲ εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο.

Παραλληλόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνατεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἑπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἰσως, καὶ ὅλος δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅτως εἰς 10 δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελευτῆσαι. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ τι κατὰ μέρος εὑρήσῃ καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγνωστέρων πειρατόμεν ἔπελθειν, εἰτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμάτων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποιὰ σώζει καὶ

rience, yet it is useless to the unscientific. Possibly, therefore, the collections both of laws and of political constitutions may be of good service to such as are able thoughtfully to consider them, and to judge what suits well or ill, or what institutions are adapted to what circumstances; but in those who, having no such mental conditions, go into such subjects, correct judgment is not likely to be found, unless indeed by a kind of natural instinct; though they may, no doubt, come to have greater intelligence in these matters.

As, then, former writers have passed over the subject of legislation without investigation, it is perhaps better that we should ourselves more fully consider it, and generally indeed the whole subject of government, in order that, to 10 the best of our power, the philosophy of humanity may be brought to completion.

In the first place then, if aught has been said well, though partially, by the writers who preceded us, let us endeavour to recapitulate it; and next, from the collected constitutions to consider well what causes preserve or destroy the states which have tried them, and what institutions
are good or bad for particular forms of government; also from what causes some are well and others are badly conducted. For when these matters have been duly considered, we are likely to get a better general view both of what kind of polity is best, and how ordered in each case, and by adopting what laws and customs. Let us proceed then to speak of Politics, commencing at this point.¹

¹. The Ethics therefore were or rather, the two formed a consecrated and continuous work.

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